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UNDERSTANDING THE U.S. NEws LAW
SCHOOL RANKINGS
Theodore P. Seto*
UCH has been written on whether law schools can or should be
ranked and on the U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT ("U.S.
NEWS") rankings in particular.' Indeed, in 1997, one hundred
*Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The author is very grateful for the
comments, too numerous to mention, given in response to his SSRN postings. He wants to
give particular thanks to his wife, Professor Sande Buhai, for her patience in bearing with
the unique agonies of numerical analysis.
1. See, e.g., Michael Ariens, Law School Branding and the Future of Legal Education,
34 ST. MARY'S L. J. 301 (2003); Arthur Austin, The Postmodern Buzz in Law School Rank-
ings, 27 VT. L. REv. 49 (2002); Scott Baker et al., The Rat Race as an Information-Forcing
Device, 81 IND. L. J. 53 (2006); Mitchell Berger, Why the U.S. News & World Report Law
School Rankings Are Both Useful and Important, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 487 (2001); Bernard
S. Black & Paul L. Caron, Ranking Law Schools: Using SSRN to Measure Scholarly Per-
formance, 81 IND. L. J. 83 (2006); Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, Dead Poets and Academic
Progenitors, 81 IND. L. J. 1 (2006); Paul D. Carrington, On Ranking: A Response to Mitch-
ell Berger, 53 J. LEGAL EDUc. 301 (2003); Terry Carter, Rankled by the Rankings, 84
A.B.A. J. 46 (1998); Ronald A. Cass, So, Why Do You Want To Be a Lawyer? What the
ABA, the AALS, and U.S. News Don't Know That We Do, 31 U. TOE. L. REV. 573 (2000);
Francine Cullari, Law School Rankings Fail to Account for All Factors, 81 MICH. Bus. L. J.
52 (2002); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Scholarly Profit Margins: Reflections on the Web, 81
IND. L. J. 271 (2006); R. Lawrence Dessem, U.S. News U.: Or, the Fighting Volunteer Hur-
ricanes, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 468 (2002); Theodore Eisenberg, Assessing the SSRN-Based
Law School Rankings, 81 IND. L. J. 285 (2006); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells,
Ranking and Explaining the Scholarly Impact of Law Schools, 27 J. LEGAL ST-mD. 373
(1998); Rafael Gely, Segmented Rankings for Segmented Markets, 81 IND. L. J. 293 (2006);
Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law
Schools, 81 IND. L. J. 141 (2006); Joanna L. Grossman, Feminist Law Journals and the
Rankings Conundrum, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 522 (2003); William D. Henderson &
Andrew P. Morriss, Student Quality as Measured by LSAT Scores: Migration Patterns in
the U.S. News Rankings Era, 81 IND. L. J. 163 (2006); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Destruction
of the Holistic Approach to Admissions: The Pernicious Effects of Rankings, 81 IND. L. J.
309 (2006); Sam Kamin, How the Blogs Saved Law School: Why a Diversity of Voices Will
Undermine the U.S. News & World Report Rankings, 81 IND. L. J. 375 (2006); Russell
Korobkin, Harnessing the Positive Power of Rankings: A Response to Posner and Sunstein,
81 IND. L. J. 35 (2006); Russell Korobkin, In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solutions to
Coordination and Collective Action Problems, 77 TEX. L. REV. 403 (1998); Brian Leiter,
How to Rank Law Schools, 81 IND. L. J. 47 (2006); Brian Leiter, Measuring the Academic
Distinction of Law Faculties, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 451 (2000); Mark Lemley, Rank, 3 GREEN
BAG 2 D 457 (2000); James Lindgren & Daniel Seltzer, The Most Prolific Law Professors
and Faculties, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 781 (1996). Prof. Tom W. Bell has blogged extensively
about his model of the U.S. News law school rankings. See, e.g., Reforming the USN&WR
Law School Rankings, http://agoraphilia.blogspot.com/2006/08/reforming-usnwr-law-
school-rankings.html (Aug. 9, 1006, 15:34 EST). To date, however, he has not made his
model publicly available. See also Richard S. Markovits, The Professional Assessment of
Legal Academics: On the Shift from Evaluator Judgment to Market Evaluations, 48 J. LE-
GAL EDUC. 417 (1998); Rachel F. Moran, Of Rankings and Regulation: Are the U.S. News
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fifty law school deans took the unusual step of signing a joint letter con-
demning the U.S. News rankings. 2 The following year, the Association of
American Law Schools commissioned a study by Drs. Stephen Klein and
Laura Hamilton (the "Klein-Hamilton report") calling the U.S. News
rankings' validity into question.3 Nevertheless, U.S. News has continued
to compute and publish its rankings. This Article focuses on U.S. News's
special issue entitled America's Best Graduate Schools published in spring
2006, posted online as "America's Best Graduate Schools 2007" 4 (the
"2007 issue"). U.S. News's staff confirms, however, that its methodology
has not changed in any respect in the past year.5 While some of the num-
bers may have changed, therefore, the Article's analysis applies equally
to the "2008" rankings issued on March 30, 2007.
Like many law professors, I have long found the U.S. News rankings
perplexing. Although I generally focus on the school at which I teach-
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles-and its ranking competitors, the na-
ture of my difficulties is better illustrated by U.S. News's 2007 ranking of
three of America's best-known law schools: Yale (ranked 1st), Stanford
(ranked 2nd), and Harvard (ranked 3rd).6 As a Harvard graduate, I con-
fess bias. I also want to assure readers that I hold both Yale and Stanford
in very high regard. Nevertheless, I suggest that even impartial observers
might perceive a need for further justification of U.S. News's bottom line
with respect to these schools.
Consider the following Harvard-Stanford statistics. About 58% of
Harvard's students had Law School Admission Test scores (LSATs) of
& World Report Rankings Really a Subversive Voice in Legal Education?, 81 IND. L. J. 383
(2006); Richard Morgan, Law School Rankings, 13-JUL NEV. LAW. 36 (2005); Patrick T.
O'Day & George D. Kuh, Assessing What Matters in Law School: The Law School Survey
of Student Engagement, 81 IND. L. J. 401 (2006); Richard A. Posner, Law School Rankings,
81 IND. L. J. 13 (2006); Nancy B. Rapoport, Eating Our Cake and Having It, Too: Why
Real Change is So Difficult in Law Schools, 81 IND. L. J. 359 (2006); Nancy B. Rapoport,
Ratings, Not Rankings: Why U.S. News & World Report Shouldn't Want to be Compared to
Time and Newsweek-or The New Yorker, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 1097 (1999); Michael Sauder
& Wendy Nelson Espeland, Strength in Numbers? The Advantages of Multiple Rankings,
81 IND. L. J. 205 (2006); Michael E. Solimine, Status Seeking and the Allure and Limits of
Law School Rankings, 81 IND. L. J. 299 (2006); Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Interplay Between
Law School Rankings, Reputations, and Resource Allocation: Ways Rankings Mislead, 81
IND. L. J. 229 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Ranking Law Schools: A Market Test?, 81 IND. L.
J. 25 (2006); David A. Thomas, The Law School Rankings Are Harmful Deceptions: A
Response to Those Who Praise the Rankings and Suggestions for a Better Approach to Eval-
uating Law Schools, 40 Hous. L. REV. 419 (2003); David C. Yamada, Same Old, Same Old:
Law School Rankings and the Affirmation of Hierarchy, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 249
(1997).
2. Russell Korobkin, In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solutions to Coordination
and Collective Action Problems, 77 TEX. L. REv. 403, 403 (1998).
3. See Stephen P. Klein & Laura Hamilton, The Validity of the U.S. News & World
Report Ranking of ABA Law Schools, Feb. 18, 1998, http://www.aals.org/reports/validity.
html.
4. See America's Best Graduate 2007 Edition, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Apr.
2006, at 44-47, available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/grad/rankings/law/awindex
_brief.php.
5. Telephone Interview with Mr. Samuel Flanigan, Deputy Director of Data Re-
search, U.S. News & World Report (Mar. 30, 2007).
6. America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 44.
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172 or higher; in absolute numbers, about 980 students.7 Harvard's law
library-the heart of any research institution-was without peer.8 Legal
academics ranked Harvard with Yale as the best school in the country. 9
Stanford, by contrast, reported that only about 25% of its much smaller
student body had LSATs of 172 or higher; in absolute numbers, about 130
students (about 13% as many as Harvard).10 Its law library was about
one-quarter the size of Harvard's-indeed, it was smaller than the library
at the school at which I teach.11 Consistent with these objective indica-
tors, legal academics ranked Stanford lower than Harvard; judges and
lawyers ranked them the same.12 Yet U.S. News ranked Stanford over
Harvard.13 "Why?," I wondered. And what might that mean about U.S.
News's relative ranking of less well-known schools?
U.S. News's conclusions with regard to Yale and Harvard were also
puzzling. The two were ranked equally by law professors; judges and
practitioners ranked Yale slightly higher. 14 Yale reported that only about
50% of its students had LSATs of 172 or higher; in absolute numbers,
about 290 students (about 30% as many as Harvard). 15 Yale's graduates
passed the New York bar examination at a lower rate than Harvard's-
marginally lower, but lower nevertheless.16 Yale's law library was less
than half the size of Harvard's. 17 Yet U.S. News awarded Yale an "over-
all score" of 100, Harvard an "overall score" of only 91-a nine-point
difference.18 In the U.S. News universe, a nine-point difference was
huge-further down the scale, for example, it meant the difference be-
tween being ranked in the top 20 and being excluded from the top 40.19
Indeed, as I began playing with a spreadsheet I had written to replicate
the 2007 U.S. News computations, I discovered that even if Harvard had
reported a perfect median LSAT of 180, it still would have been ranked
third. And even if Yale had reported a median LSAT of just 153 (placing
it in the "fourth tier" of law schools ranked by LSAT),20 it still would
have been ranked first. Indeed, Yale would have been ranked higher
7. Computed by interpolation based on Harvard's reported 75th percentile LSAT
(176), 50th percentile LSAT (173), and 2004-2005 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) JD student
count (1,679). See id. at 150-51.
8. See Association of Research Libraries, ARL Academic Law Library Statistics
2004-05, http://www.orl.org/bm-doc/law05.pdf, at 24.
9. America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 44.
10. Computed by interpolation based on Stanford's reported 75th percentile LSAT
(172), 50th percentile LSAT (169) and 2004-2005 FTE JD student count (514). See id. at
144.
11. See National Jurist, How Law School Libraries Stack Up, http://www.nationaljurist.
com/filedownload.aspx?f=dRotj7dclsFOIyG7lyDGQQ==.
12. America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 44.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Computed by interpolation based on Yale's reported 75th percentile LSAT (175),
50th percentile LSAT (172), and 2004-2005 FTE JD student count (581). See id. at 46.
16. Id. at 44.
17. See Association of Research Libraries, supra note 8.
18. America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 44.
19. Id.
20. Tied with thirteen other schools for 147th out of 180. See id. at 47.
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than Harvard even if both had been true-if Harvard had reported a per-
fect median LSAT and Yale a 153. I was stunned. Was Yale really that
much better than Harvard in all other material respects? If not, what
might the parts of U.S. News's methodology that led to these counterin-
tuitive results tell one about the validity of U.S. News's ranking of other
schools?
This Article reports the results of my explorations. Its descriptions,
analyses, and conclusions are based primarily on U.S. News's published
descriptions of its 2007 computations, telephone conversations with U.S.
News's staff clarifying those descriptions, and a spreadsheet I have writ-
ten that approximately replicates those computations. The Article's goals
are relatively modest: to help prospective students, employers, and other
law school stakeholders read the U.S. News rankings more critically and
to help law school administrators get a better handle on how to manage
their schools' rankings. In addition, the Article suggests ways in which
U.S. News methodology might be improved. It does not, however, pur-
port to offer a systematic critique of either the U.S. News rankings or
ranking in general.
Part I describes both U.S. News's methodology and problems involved
in replicating it. Part II is intended to help prospective students, employ-
ers, and other law school stakeholders read U.S. News's results intelli-
gently. Prospective students and others trying to understand how to use
U.S. News's rankings in their decision-making may wish to focus on this
part, although a reading of Part I may also be necessary to understand
some of the technical details. Part III addresses the problem of managing
rankings. Part IV, finally, suggests ways in which the rankings might be
improved.
PART I. COMPUTING THE RANKINGS
U.S. News's 2007 ranking process began with twelve input variables.21
According to the methodological description published in the 2007 issue,
those variables were "standardized," weighted, and totaled.22 The result-
ing raw combined scores were then "rescaled so that the top school re-
ceived 100 and other schools received a percentage of the top score. '23
U.S. News labeled the resulting figure the school's "overall score," report-
ing this score to the nearest integer for each of the one hundred law
schools with the highest such scores, in rank order.2 4 In addition, it classi-
fied the thirty-six law schools with the next highest overall scores as
"third tier" and the remaining forty-four as "fourth tier," listing the
schools in each such tier alphabetically without reporting their overall
21. Id. at 45.
22. Robert J. Morse & Samuel Flanigan, The Ranking Methodology, U.S. NEWS &





scores or ranks within their respective tiers.2 5
A. THE INPUT VARIABLES
1. Peer assessment scores
U.S. News's first input variable reported the results of a survey admin-
istered by U.S. News in the fall of 2005, in which "the law school dean,
dean of academic affairs, chair of faculty appointments, and the most re-
cently tenured faculty member at each law school accredited by the
American Bar Association" were asked to rate law schools on a 1 to 5
scale, with "1" meaning "marginal" and "5" meaning "outstanding. '26
The 2007 issue reported that 67% of surveyed academics responded. 27
The average score awarded to each law school was published in the 2007
issue itself; these average scores were apparently not further modified
before being "standardized" and combined with U.S. News's remaining
input variables.
2. Assessment scores by lawyers/judges
A second input variable reported the results of a similar survey of law-
yers and judges in the fall of 2005.28 U.S. News did not disclose how its
respondents were chosen-how they were distributed geographically, be-
tween large and small firms, or, in the case of judges, between state and
federal or trial and appellate courts. The 2007 issue did report that only
26% of those to whom the survey was sent actually responded.2 9 It did
not report whether members of the group that responded differed demo-
graphically from those to whom the survey had initially been sent. As
was true of peer assessment scores, average scores for the various law
schools were published in the 2007 issue and apparently not adjusted
before being incorporated in U.S. News's further computations.
3. Median LSATs
In computing its third variable, "median LSAT scores," U.S. News be-
gan with each school's median LSAT score for first-year full-time stu-
dents entering in 2005.30 Scores for part-time students-most
25. America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 46-47.
26. Id. at 45. The letter soliciting participation in the survey stated that: "This survey
is being sent to the law school dean, dean of academic affairs, chair of faculty appoint-
ments, and the most recently tenured faculty member at each law school accredited by the
American Bar Association." Letter from Robert Morse, Director of Data Research, U.S.
News & World Report, to Richard Bales, Professor of Law, Chase School of Law (Sept. 29,
2005) (on file with the author).
27. America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 45.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. It appears that U.S. News used median LSAT and Undergraduate Grade Point
Average (UGPA) figures for Baylor that omitted students who had matriculated in the




importantly, scores for students in evening programs-were omitted.31
Although the 2007 issue reported the 25th and 75th percentile LSATs for
each school's full-time students, those figures were not actually used in
computing the rankings; the medians reported by each school to U.S.
News were used instead.32 In creating my spreadsheet, I used the medi-
ans themselves, as published by the American Bar Association (ABA). 33
The next step was critical but not publicly disclosed: before being
"standardized" and combined with other input variables, all median
LSAT scores were first converted into percentile equivalents. 34 In other
words, a median LSAT of 150 became approximately 42.7%, 160 became
approximately 79.7%, 170 became approximately 97.5%, and so on. This
conversion significantly changed the effect of LSATs on overall scores.
Differences in high LSAT scores are minimized when converted into per-
centiles; differences in lower LSAT scores are exaggerated. For example,
the one-point difference between a 172 (98.6 percentile) and a 173 (98.9
percentile) converts to a .3 difference in percentile points; the same one-
point difference between a 153 (54.6 percentile) and a 154 (59.3 percen-
tile) converts into a 4.7 difference in percentile points-more than 15
times larger. Although differences in LSATs accounted for 12.5% of dif-
ferences in overall scores on average, at the high end they accounted for
much less, at the low end for more.
Unfortunately, there is no fixed way of converting LSAT scores into
percentile equivalents. Because students sitting for a particular LSAT ad-
ministration may do a little better or a little worse than those taking the
test on a different date, percentile equivalents will not be identical across
test administrations. Because the number of students who take the LSAT
is large, however, fluctuations are likely to be small. U.S. News did not
disclose which LSAT percentile conversion table it used. In my spread-
sheet, I used the table for the combined June, October, and December
html (June 27, 2006, 10:27 EST). This was clearly incorrect. The ABA 2005 Annual Ques-
tionnaire Part II: Enrollment states:
In order to obtain a complete picture of the admissions statistics of a law
school, the school must include all persons in the particular category, regard-
less of whether that person was admitted through any special admissions pro-
gram rather than through the normal admissions process. The admissions
year is calculated from October 1 through September 30. Schools which ad-
mit in the spring and/or summer must include those students in the totals.
American Bar Association, ABA 2005 Annual Questionnaire Part 2, at 1. As a result of
this error, Baylor was ranked 51st when in fact it should have been ranked 56th. Arizona
State, Cardozo, Cincinnati, and Florida State were ranked 53rd when they should have
been ranked 52nd, and Utah was ranked 57th when it should have been ranked 56th. All
results reported in this Article assume that the Baylor error is corrected.
31. See America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 45.
32. Morse, supra note 22.
33. See ABA.LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS 67 (2007
ed.), available at http://officialguide.lsac.org (LSAT and UGPA figures are for the 2005
entering class); id. at 70-829 (data for each school).
34. Telephone interview with Samuel Flanigan, Deputy Director of Data Research,
U.S. News & World Report (June 2, 2006).
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2005 administrations-the only table reported on LSAC's website. 35 My
conversions may therefore not be identical to U.S. News's, but are proba-
bly not significantly different.
4. Median UGPAs
Like median LSATs, the median undergraduate grade point averages
(UGPAs) of first-year full-time students entering in 2005 were not actu-
ally reported in the 2007 issue. Instead, the 2007 issue reported the 25th
and 75th percentile UGPAs, computed on a 4.0 scale, for each school. 36
Again, in creating my spreadsheet, I used the actual medians for full-time
students published by the ABA.37 Unlike median LSATs, however, me-
dian UGPAs were incorporated directly into U.S. News's final computa-
tion; they were not first restated in percentile terms.38 This meant that
their effects on overall scores were uniform across the entire range of law
schools. Because the effects of median LSATs were understated at the
top and overstated at the bottom, median UGPAs ended up having a
more significant effect on overall scores and therefore on relative rank-
ings for top-ranked schools; for lower-ranked schools, the reverse was
true.39
5. Acceptance rates
U.S. News labeled its fifth variable "acceptance rate" or "proportion of
applicants accepted."'40 The number it reported for each school in its
2007 issue reflected the percentage of applicants for the 2005 entering
class actually accepted by that school. 41 Again, only applications and ac-
ceptances for each school's full-time program were taken into account;
evening program applications and acceptances were omitted.42
U.S. News faced a technical problem in combining the resulting varia-
ble with others. In the case of acceptance rates, lower is better; lower
acceptance rates suggest greater selectivity. For the first four variables,
by contrast, higher is better (for example, higher reputation scores,
LSATs, or UGPAs). To combine acceptance rates with its other variables
in a meaningful way, therefore, U.S. News had to invert the acceptance
rate data set to make higher better. It accomplished this by subtracting
all acceptance rates from 1 (or 100%). 43 The effect was to convert ac-
35. The table is posted on a portion of the Law School Admissions Council website
not accessible to the public.
36. See America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 44.
37. See LSAC Official Guide to ABA-Approved Law Schools, UGPA Search, http://
officialguide.lsac.org/UGPASearch/Search3.aspx?SidString=.
38. America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 45.
39. The switch-over point appears to have been an LSAT of approximately 161.




43. Telephone conversation with Samuel Flanagan, Deputy Director of Data Re-
search, U.S. News & World Report (June 2, 2006).
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ceptance rates into rejection rates. These rejection rates were then "stan-
dardized" and combined with U.S. News's remaining input variables. 44
6. Employment rates at graduation
U.S. News reported employment rates at graduation for students grad-
uating in 2004 for one hundred thirty-two schools; 45 it did not report such
rates for the remaining forty-eight, apparently because the forty-eight in
question had not reported such rates to U.S. News. With respect to the
rates actually reported, the 2007 issue stated: "[e]mployment rates in-
clude graduates reported as working or pursuing graduate degrees ....
Those not seeking jobs are excluded. ' 46 Graduates working part-time or
working in non-law-related jobs were counted as employed for this pur-
pose.47 For the forty-eight schools not reporting such rates, the 2007 issue
noted "N/A" in its tables. 48 For purposes of including this variable in its
computation of overall scores, however, it estimated employment rates at
graduation (EG) for those schools based on their reported employment
rates nine months after graduation (E9), using the equation:
EG = (E9 * .996) -. 29449
This was apparently intended to capture the relationship, on average, be-
tween the two variables for schools reporting both numbers.
7. Employment rates nine months after graduation
The 2007 issue also reported employment rates nine months after grad-
uation for students graduating in 2004.50 All schools reported the rele-
vant rates; no estimation was therefore required. For purposes of this
variable only, the issue stated, "25 percent of those whose status is un-
known are also counted as working. '51
8. Bar passage rate indicators
Each school's "bar passage ratio indicator" was based on first-time bar
passage rates in the summer 2004 and winter 2005 bar examination ad-
ministrations in the state in which the largest number of 2004 graduates
of that school sat for the bar-not necessarily the state in which the
school was located. 52 The 2007 issue reported each school's relevant first-
time bar passage rate, the state for which the school's bar passage rate
was measured, and the overall bar passage rate for that state, but did not
44. See Morse, supra note 22.
45. America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 45.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 45-47.
49. Telephone interview with Mr. Samuel Flanigan, Deputy Director of Data Re-
search, U.S. News & World Report (June 5, 2006). The same equation was used to estimate
employment rates at graduation in the 2008 issue. Telephone interview with Mr. Samuel
Flanigan, Deputy Director of Data Research, U.S. News & World Report (Mar. 30, 2007).





report the "bar passage ratio indicator" itself.53 Each school's bar pas-
sage ratio indicator was then computed as its relevant first-time bar pas-
sage rate divided by the overall bar passage rate for the state in
question.54 The resulting figures were then "standardized" and combined
with the remaining input variables. 55
9. Expenditures per student for instruction, library, and supporting
services
Law school financial data, collected separately by both the ABA and
U.S. News, are not published by either. The ABA, however, provides law
school deans with a compilation of computer-generated reports, called
"take-offs," summarizing at least some of the collected data (the "Take-
Offs"). 56 There are several problems with using ABA Take-Off data in
lieu of the unpublished numbers actually used by U.S. News. First, ABA
Take-Offs are marked "confidential" and are not readily accessible, even
to law school faculty members.57 Second, it is not clear that law schools
report the same numbers to U.S. News that they report to the ABA. Dis-
crepancies may arise simply by reason of the fact that U.S. News requests
its numbers later, by which time at least some schools may have further
refined their figures. In addition, it must be assumed that U.S. News
seeks clarification from the relevant school if a particular number seems
out of line. Such refinements or clarifications will not necessarily be re-
flected in the ABA Take-Offs. Third, the Take-Offs sometimes omit data
entirely for one or more schools. Since the data set is "standardized"
before being combined with other variables, even one omission can have
significant effects on rankings, including the relative rankings of schools
other than the one for which data is missing. Fourth, the Take-Offs con-
tain a distressingly high number of either input or arithmetic errors. For
example, the Take-Offs report that one "third tier" school increased its
"direct" expenditures from under $6 million in 2003-2004 (a number con-
sistent with its ranking) to over $65 million in 2004-2005-a more than
ten-fold jump. One assumes that the 2004-2005 figure reflected an input
error. In any event, that school's U.S. News ranking did not move corre-
spondingly, so it does not appear that U.S. News used the ABA number.
Finally, if U.S. News had used numbers identical to those reported in the
ABA Take-Offs, it ought to be possible to replicate U.S. News's analysis
fairly closely by plugging those numbers into the methodology U.S. News
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. Morse, supra note 22.
56. See, e.g., American Bar Association, Take-offs from the 2005-06 Annual ABA
Law School Questionnaire.
57. I had access to them by reason of the fact that my Dean had asked me to analyze
them. Pursuant to the ABA's request, I have not disclosed any school-identifiable data in




says it used. It is not. In sum, the ABA Take-Offs appear to approximate
the numbers U.S. News actually used, but do not appear to be identical.
With these caveats, the variable entitled "average 2004 and 2005 ex-
penditures per student for instruction, library, and supporting services"
(hereafter "'educational' expenses per student") used in computing the
2007 U.S. News rankings, 58 began with a number defined in the same way
as "Total Direct Expenditures," reported in Table F-15 of the ABA Take-
Offs, reduced by "Tuition Reimbursements, Grants, and Loan Forgive-
ness," also reported in that table.59 U.S. News divided the resulting num-
ber by the "full-time equivalent" (FTE) number of J.D. students-a
number reported in Table C-9 of the ABA Take-Offs. 60 The resulting
expenditures-per-student figures for 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 for each
school were then averaged. 61
Three aspects of this computation deserve note here. First, although
U.S. News called this variable "expenditures per student for instruction,
library, and supporting services," because of the way the ABA defines
"direct expenditures," the variable in fact included all current expenses
charged to the law school's budget other than expenses in eleven nar-
rowly defined categories and expenses of "auxiliary enterprises"-re-
gardless of how directly such expenses related to the school's J.D.
educational program. 62 If a school's LL.M. programs were included in
the school's budget, for example, all expenses of such programs were in-
cluded in this U.S. News variable. If a school's clinics were included in
the school's budget, their costs were similarly included; if they had their
own budgets, they were not. If expenses were capital rather than current,
they were excluded, although "capital" for this purpose was defined in a
very peculiar way. What is included in this variable and what is not is
explored in greater detail in Part II.B(4) below.
Second, scholarships were explicitly disfavored in the computation. Al-
though the ABA includes scholarships in "direct expenditures," U.S.
News shifted them into its lower-weighted "expenditures per student on
all other items including financial aid" category. 63 As a result, schools
that chose to allocate revenues to scholarships rather than to other pur-
poses were down-rated.
Third, although all "expenditures ... for instruction, library, and sup-
porting services" were counted, including expenditures on programs
other than the J.D., only J.D. students were included in the "full-time
equivalent" count.64 This meant that schools with large LL.M. or other
58. America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 45.
59. American Bar Association, supra note 56, at Table F-15.
60. See id. at Table C-9.
61. America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 45.
62. See American Bar Association, supra note 56, at Table F-15.
63. America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 45.
64. Telephone interview with Samuel Flanigan, Deputy Director of Data Research,
U.S. News & World Report (June 27, 2006).
[Vol. 60
Law School Rankings
non-J.D. programs were credited with artificially high educational ex-
penditures per student.
Before these two-year average expenditures-per-student numbers were
"standardized" and combined with other variables, they were further
modified in an important but undisclosed way: U.S. News applied cost-
of-living-adjustments (COLAs), obtained from Runzheimer Interna-
tional, to reflect different costs of living in different locations.65 Unfortu-
nately, the Runzheimer COLAs are not publicly available. In a
telephone conversation with a Runzheimer executive, I was told that U.S.
News had received those numbers on an accommodation basis because of
its media status and that I would not be able to afford a comparable set.66
I therefore purchased a set of reasonably-priced COLAs from the Ameri-
can Chamber of Commerce Resource Association (ACCRA), a not-for-
profit source of COLAs, instead.67
In attempting to use the ACCRA COLAs, however, I discovered two
problems with using them in place of the COLAs U.S. News had used.
First, the relative costs of living in different locations vary with profession
and economic status. In some towns, law professors live at the top of the
real estate market; in others (Los Angeles, for example), they live more
modestly. Secretarial and janitorial staffs often face different cost of liv-
ing issues than those faced by professors. The ACCRA COLAs were not
broken out by socioeconomic status; the Runzheimer COLAs, I was told,
were. Second and more importantly, COLAs can vary markedly depend-
ing on how one draws the geographic boundaries of different COLA re-
gions. Should Yale Law School data be adjusted to reflect New Haven
COLAs? Or should average Connecticut COLAs be used instead? Or
perhaps COLAs for the New York City metropolitan area? U.S. News's
staff informed me that it had used "metropolitan area" COLAs for
schools located in "metropolitan areas," but had otherwise used state
averages.68 Since I lacked access to Runzheimer's definition of "metro-
politan areas," it was often impossible to determine which COLA had
been applied. The ACCRA data set was broken up geographically by
reporting political units, not "metropolitan areas."'69 Manhattan, for ex-
65. Telephone interview with Samuel Flanigan, Deputy Director of Data Research,
U.S. News & World Report (June 14, 2006); see also Runzheimer International-Cost of
Living Information for Compensation, Relocation, and Recruitment, http://www.
runzheimer.com/web/gms/home.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2007).
66. Telephone interview with Runzheimer Executive (June 21, 2006).
67. See Michael S. Knoll & Thomas D. Griffith, Taxing Sunny Days: Adjusting Taxes
for Regional Living Costs and Amenities, 116 HARV. L. REV. 987, 990 n.18 (2003) ("The
best data on United States regional costs of living is compiled by ACCRA, a nonprofit
organization comprising the research staffs of chambers of commerce and other organiza-
tions. ACCRA compiles data quarterly from local chambers of commerce that have volun-
teered to price a list of goods and services in their communities."). ACCRA has since
changed its name to "The Counsel for Community and Economic Research," abbreviated
"C2ER." See http://www.coli.org.
68. Telephone Interview with Samuel Flanigan, Deputy Director of Data Research,
U.S. News & World Report (June 14, 2006).




ample, was separate from Queens. 70 In addition, the ACCRA data set
only included numbers for political units that had chosen to participate. 71
Brooklyn and Minneapolis, for example, were omitted entirely, and the
ACCRA data set did not include state average COLAs.72
If I had had financial data I knew to be accurate, I could have com-
puted the COLAs actually used. But the ABA Take-Off numbers ap-
peared to be less than completely reliable. The COLAs I used in my
spreadsheet were therefore plug numbers: I began with the most appar-
ently relevant ACCRA COLAs, but adjusted them as necessary to force
the spreadsheet to generate "overall scores" identical to those reported
by U.S. News for the 100 schools for which such scores were reported.
With some exceptions, the resulting COLA/error correction numbers
seemed plausible as COLAs. This aspect of my analysis, however, was
only approximately accurate. In any event, the COLA-adjusted average
of each school's 2003-04 and 2004-05 "educational" expenditures per stu-
dent became U.S. News's ninth variable.
10. Expenditures per student on all other items including financial aid
U.S. News's tenth variable, entitled "average 2004 and 2005 expendi-
tures per student on all other items including financial aid," 73 began with
an expenditure number defined in the same way as "Total Indirect Ex-
penditures" reported in Table F-15 of the ABA Take-Offs.74 To this was
added the school's "Tuition Reimbursements, Grants, and Loan Forgive-
ness," also reported in that table.75 (In effect, U.S. News took "Tuition
Reimbursements, Grants, and Loan Forgiveness" and moved it from the
ABA's direct expenditure category to the ABA's indirect expenditure
category. Apart from this change, U.S. News's ninth variable corresponds
to direct expenditures; its tenth, to indirect expenditures.). U.S. News di-
vided the resulting number by the "full-time equivalent" number of J.D.
students at the school.76 The resulting expenditures-per-student figures
for 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 for each school were then averaged and
adjusted for differences in cost of living before being "standardized" and
combined with the remaining input variables. 77 These will be referred to
hereafter as "other expenditures per student"; what is included and what
is not is discussed in greater detail in Part II.B(4) below.
11. Student/faculty ratios




73. America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 45.
74. American Bar Association, supra note 56, at Table F-15.
75. Id.
76. America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 45.
77. Morse, supra note 22.
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ratio had been reported to U.S. News. 78 Unfortunately, the ratio re-
ported by U.S. News was different from the ratio reported in Table B-2 of
the ABA Take-Offs for a majority of schools;79 the U.S. News-reported
ratio was sometimes higher, sometimes lower. U.S. News's questionnaire
merely requested that each school report its student/faculty ratio based
on the data it had reported in response to Part 5 of the ABA Question-
naire. 80 That Part 5, however, did not actually require schools to com-
pute such ratios; nor did it provide any guidance as to how to do so.81
Based solely on the U.S. News and ABA questionnaires, therefore, it was
unclear whether respondents should compute the ratio based on actual
faculty or FTE faculty, actual students or FTE students, J.D.s or all stu-
dents. Different schools apparently resolved these questions in different
ways. The student/teacher ratios reported in the 2007 issue and used in
the 2007 rankings therefore do not appear to have been computed on a
consistent basis from school to school.
This variable posed the same technical problem as acceptance rates:
higher student/faculty ratios are worse, lower are better. Again, to com-
bine student/faculty ratios with its other variables in a meaningful way,
U.S. News had to invert the relevant data set to make higher better. It
accomplished this by subtracting each school's student/faculty ratio from
the highest reported student/faculty ratio, which in 2007 turned out to be
25.2.82 (Because of the way it "standardized" the various data sets before
combining them, the fact that it used different techniques for inverting
the acceptance rate and student/faculty ratio data sets turned out to be
mathematically irrelevant.). The resulting number then became each
school's eleventh variable.
12. Total numbers of volumes and titles in library
U.S. News added together the total number of volumes and the total
number of titles in each school's library to produce its final variable. 83
Although this had the effect of double-counting some volumes, it presum-
ably reflected a compromise between two techniques it believed plausible
for rating libraries. The 2007 issue did not report any of the library statis-
tics actually used, presumably because the resulting numbers would not
have communicated anything meaningful to readers. I obtained the rele-
vant numbers from the Law Library Comprehensive Statistical Table,
Columns 5c and lc, in the 2005 ABA Take-Offs. 84
78. See America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 45.
79. See American Bar Association, supra note 56, at Table B-2.
80. Telephone Interview with Samuel Flanigan, Deputy Director of Data Research,
U.S. News & World Report (Jan. 31, 2007).
81. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 2007 U.S. News Law Schools Statistical Survey, at
Question 80.
82. Telephone Interview with Samuel Flanigan, Deputy Director of Data Research,
U.S. News & World Report (June 2, 2006).
83. America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 45.
84. American Bar Association, supra note 56, Law Library Comprehensive Statistical
Table Data from Fall 2005 Annual Questionnaire.
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B. COMPUTING OVERALL SCORES AND RANKING THE SCHOOLS
Because each of the twelve variables was measured on a different scale,
those scales had to be "standardized" before the variables could be com-
bined. U.S. News accomplished this by normalizing them, using a com-
mon forced mean and a common forced standard deviation.8 5 Since the
resulting raw overall scores were then to be rescaled, the forced mean
and standard deviation actually used were irrelevant-any common
forced mean and standard deviation would have produced the same re-
scaled results. In his analysis, parts of which he has published in his web-
blog, Tom Bell uses "z-scores,"8 6 which reflect a forced mean of zero and
a forced standard deviation of one.87 In my analysis, I used a forced
mean and standard deviation similar to those of U.S. News's reported
"overall scores" so as to make the disaggregated normalized figures more
intuitively meaningful.
In any event, after being normalized, the twelve input variables were
weighted as follows:
Peer assessment score 25%
Lawyer/judge assessment score 15%
Employment rate at nine months 14%
Median LSAT percentile equivalents 2.5%
Median undergraduate GPAs 10%
"Educational" expenditures per student 9.75%
Employment rate at graduation 4%
Student/teacher ratio (inverted) 3%
Acceptance rate (inverted) 2.5%
Bar passage ratio indicator 2%
Other expenditures per student 1.5%
Library volumes and titles 0.75%
The resulting numbers were added together.
According to the 2007 issue, the resulting raw combined scores were
then "rescaled so that the top school received 100 and other schools re-
ceived a percentage of the top score." s88 The U.S. News staff clarified this
description further: the raw scores were rescaled by setting the top score
at 100, the bottom score at zero, and the remaining scores, rounded to the
nearest integer, in a manner proportional to their respective distances
from the top and bottom. 89 Mathematically, my spreadsheet accom-
plished this by applying a forced mean and forced standard deviation to
85. Telephone Interview with Samuel Flanigan, Deputy Director of Data Research,
U.S. News & World Report (June 2, 2006).
86. Z-Scores in Model of U.S. News & World Report's Law School Rankings, http://
agoraphilia.blogspot.com/2006/06/z-scores-in-model-of-usnwrs-law-school.html (June 7,
2006 16:32 EST).
87. Russell D. Hoffman, Z Score, Internet Glossary of Statistical Terms, http://www.
animatedsoftware.com/statglos/sgzscore.htm (last visited May 19, 2007).
88. Morse, supra note 22.
89. Telephone Interview with Samuel Flanigan, Deputy Director of Data Research,
U.S. News & World Report (June 2, 2006).
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the raw combined scores, rounded to the nearest integer, and adjusting
that mean and standard deviation until they produced the requisite top
and bottom scores to two decimal points.90
U.S. News labeled the resulting figure for each school the school's
''overall score," reporting this score for each of the one hundred schools
with the highest such scores, in rank order.91 Schools that turned out to
have identical overall scores after rounding to the nearest integer were
reported as tied for the highest rank for which any of them might have
qualified. Thus, schools that shared the 17th and 18th slots after rounding
were reported as tied for 17th place.92 After ranking the schools with the
one hundred highest overall scores, U.S. News classified the thirty six
schools with the 101st through 136th highest overall scores as "third tier"
and the remaining forty four as "fourth tier," listing the schools in each
such tier alphabetically without reporting their overall scores. 93
PART II. READING THE RANKINGS CRITICALLY
What do U.S. News's ranks and overall scores mean and to what extent
can a reader prudently rely on them in making decisions? Here, it is im-
portant to distinguish between two concepts statisticians sometimes use
to answer questions like these: reliability and validity.
Statisticians say a measure is "reliable" if repeated measurements of
the same thing are likely to produce similar results. Another way of
thinking about statistical reliability is that it describes the random error of
the measure. A measure subject to significant random error is "unrelia-
ble"; a measure not subject to random error in significant amounts is "re-
liable." A measure is "valid," by contrast, if it measures what it is
supposed to measure and "invalid" if it does not. A procedure that pur-
ports to measure the quality of law schools, for example, is "valid" if it is
actually capable of measuring law school quality (whatever that means).
The two concepts are quite different. A valid measure may neverthe-
less be subject to significant random error. Or a perfectly reliable proce-
dure may not actually measure what it purports to measure. Bcfore we
can prudently rely on any measure to make decisions, we should confirm
that it is both reliable and valid. If Measurement A results in a rank of
43rd and Measurement B of the same law school results in a rank of 49th,
and if we care about a difference of six ranks, then we cannot prudently
rely on either measurement. But even if repeated measures produce con-
sistent results-that is, even if they are "reliable"-we should not use
them in making decisions if they do not actually measure what we care
about.
90. Because of my problems with the raw data, this correspondence was never exact.
In my spreadsheet, I used the forced mean and forced standard deviation that produced
the requisite top and bottom scores and then adjusted COLAs until computed overall
scores matched reported overall scores for the top one hundred schools.
91. America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 44.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 46-47.
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In addition, of course, a ranking system based on multiple inputs may
be of questionable utility if some or all of the input data sets are them-
selves questionable, for whatever reason. This article will discuss the reli-
ability and validity of specific inputs in connection with the discussion of
the validity of the ranking system as a whole. Part II is therefore divided
into two parts, addressing (1) whether the U.S. News rankings are reliable
and (2) whether the U.S. News rankings are valid.
A. RELIABILITY
I begin with my conclusions. First, U.S. News's law school "ranks" are
unreliable-that is, they are subject to significant random error.94 Sec-
ond, its "overall scores," if read with a "± 2" appended, appear to be
relatively reliable-with caveats.95
The first conclusion can be illustrated by a simple example involving a
change in the numbers of U.S. News's lowest-ranked school-which I will
call the "bottom anchor" but otherwise leave unnamed. Assume that the
reported nine-month employment rate for graduates of the bottom anchor
falls by just one percentage point and nothing else changes at any school in
the country. In a reliable ranking system, one would hope that such a
change would not affect the rank of any other school. After all, this is a
miniscule change in one statistic at a school of which few lawyers, law
professors, or law students have heard.
As one might expect, nothing happens to the bottom anchor's overall
score (by definition, zero) or rank (180th). But this tiny change wreaks
havoc on the relative ranking of the top one hundred law schools. Seattle
and San Francisco jump six ranks, Fordham jumps from 32nd to 27th, and
Rutgers Camden, San Diego, and Indiana Indianapolis each jump four.
Houston, Kansas, Nebraska, and Oregon, by contrast, each drop three
ranks. Overall, forty-one of the top one hundred schools change rank.
Fordham's dean gets a bonus. Fingers are pointed and voices raised at
Houston. All because of a trivial change in the employment statistics of a
single school far away in the spreadsheet. Stranger still, if the bottom
anchor's nine-month employment rate falls an additional four percentage
points (that is, a total of five percentage points)-and nothing else
changes at any school in the country-most of these effects disappear, but
the reordering moves into the Top Ten. University of California (UC)
Berkeley and Virginia both drop from 8th to 9th place. At the other
schools named above, it is as if nothing had ever happened.
Prospective students, employers, and faculty members, reading that
UC Berkeley and Virginia have dropped to 9th place, may decide to go
94. "Significant" means simply that the errors are of a size that the average reader
would care about.
95. "Relatively reliable" similarly means that the errors are generally of a size that the
average reader would not worry about. Note that between 2007 and 2008, Pepperdine's
overall score moved up by four points and San Diego's down by the same amount.
Whether these movements reflected real input changes or reliability problems is not clear.
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elsewhere. Regents, trustees, and university presidents, reading that Se-
attle, San Francisco, and Fordham have advanced dramatically in the
rankings, may record this accomplishment in the apparently responsible
deans' performance evaluations. What the foregoing example suggests,
however, is that basing decisions on this kind of difference or change in
U.S. News ranks is unwarranted.
The same kind of random changes in rank can occur if small changes
occur at the other end of the spreadsheet as well. Assume that Yale's
reported nine-month employment rate rises by one percentage point and
that nothing else changes at any school in the country. This relatively
minor change has no effect, of course, on Yale's overall score (by defini-
tion, 100) or rank (1st). But it makes a big difference for Harvard, which
now moves into a tie with Stanford for second place. Next, assume that
Yale's nine-month employment rate rises by just 1/10th of a percentage
point more, from 99.9% to 100%. Catastrophe! UC Hastings drops six
ranks, from 43rd to 49th, almost losing its place in the top fifty.
How can the rankings be so extraordinarily sensitive to tiny changes
unrelated to the schools affected? Two aspects of the U.S. News system
account for this sensitivity. First, the fact that U.S. News insists on as-
signing an overall score of 100 to the top-scoring school and an overall
score of zero to the bottom-score school,96 no matter what, means that
any change in one of those schools' numbers will shift the entire scale
against which other schools are measured. If any Yale number changes,
Yale's overall score cannot change. Instead, "100" is effectively redefined
to mean something new. This, in turn, means that every other overall
score (except zero) is redefined as well. Conversely, if a number at the
bottom anchor changes, "zero" is effectively redefined to mean some-
thing new-as is every other overall score except 100. As a result,
changes in input variables for Yale or the bottom anchor, particularly in
higher-weighted variables, can trigger extensive random changes across
the system.
The same is true of a change in the identity of the top or bottom
anchor. Unless U.S. News's methodology changes, Yale is unlikely to lose
its position as top anchor any time soon. But the identity of the bottom
anchor can change at any time. The 2007 issue noted that seven provi-
sionally ABA-accredited law schools were not included in the rankings
because they lacked full accreditation. 97 In future rankings, one of those
seven could displace the current bottom anchor, redefining "zero" in a
significant way.98 Or the current bottom anchor could leave the rankings.
96. See Morse, supra note 22.
97. America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 45.
98. The 2007 issue identified the seven provisionally-accredited and therefore omitted
law schools as Western State University, Barry University, Florida A&M University, Flor-
ida International University, John Marshall Law School (Atlanta), St. Thomas School of
Law (Minnesota), and Appalachian School of Law. Id. Since then, Barry, Florida A&M,
Florida International, St. Thomas, and Appalachian have received full accreditation and
four new schools have been provisionally accredited: Charleston School of Law, Faulkner
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Another school's statistics would then be used to define the meaning of
"zero"-and of every other overall score less than 100.
By itself, the foregoing problem might not produce the extreme sensi-
tivity illustrated in the foregoing examples. Perfect Yale nine-month em-
ployment numbers move UC Hastings' unrounded overall score by only
0.02 (in my spreadsheet, from 51.50 to 51.48). A second aspect of U.S.
News's system, however, magnifies this effect. Before ranking schools by
overall scores, U.S. News rounds each overall score to the nearest inte-
ger.99 A school's unrounded overall score may be slightly above the mid-
point between two integers. That score will be rounded up (from 51.50 to
52). A small change in the unrounded score, however, may push it below
the midpoint. Thereafter, the score will be rounded down (from 51.48 to
51). As a result, a small change (here, 0.02) in the school's unrounded
overall score can trigger a full one-point change (from 52 to 51) in the
score upon which relative rankings are based.
U.S. News then lumps all schools with the same rounded overall score
together and ranks them as tied. UC Hasting's rounded overall score of
52 puts it in 43rd place. 100 The hypothetical Yale employment figure
change, however, moves UC Hastings' unrounded score enough to cause
it to be rounded down to 51 instead. Under U.S. News's methodology, it
is now lumped together with schools with rounded overall scores of 51,
which U.S. News declares to be tied for 49th place. UC Hastings has just
fallen six ranks.
Before going any further, I need to make one thing clear. I am not
predicting that if Yale's nine-month employment figure goes up by 1.1
percentage points, UC Hastings will fall by six ranks. The model, as
noted, is only approximate. Because U.S. News's methodology is so sen-
sitive to small changes, even minute imperfections in any model may trig-
ger large changes in predicted rank. Every time I have made adjustments
to my model and rerun the scenarios reported above, my spreadsheet has
produced a different parade of ranking changes. The point is simply that
U.S. News's reported ranks are extraordinarily sensitive to small changes
in data or procedure-"unreliable," in the language of statisticians-for
the reasons given above.
By contrast, the parts of the U.S. News system that produce the sensi-
tivity illustrated above will generally not trigger apparently random
changes in overall scores of more than ± 2. In response to modest
changes in input variables, most overall scores change by no more than
one point, none by more than two. When schools' overall scores shift by
one or two points, they are merely shifting within that "± 2" range. This,
in turn, implies that overall scores are at least somewhat reliable-within
University Thomas Goode Jones School of Law, University of LaVerne College of Law,
and Liberty University School of Law. See American Bar Association, ABA Approved
Law Schools, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/approvedlawschools/approved.html (last vis-
ited May 19, 2007). The 2008 rankings include the four new fully accredited schools.




a two-point margin of error. (Recall, please, the difference between reli-
ability and validity-I am not asserting that they measure anything one
cares about. I am merely asserting that they are less subject to random
error.),
In reading the U.S. News rankings, therefore, it would seem prudent to
focus on overall scores, not merely on ranks. When we turn to overall
scores, however, we discover something peculiar: U.S. News only pub-
lishes scores for the one hundred schools with the highest such scores; no
scores are given for the remaining eighty.101 Why? The reason is simple.
After computing raw overall scores, U.S. News rescales all scores so that
the highest score will always be 100 and the lowest score will always be
zero. Were it to publish all of its rescaled overall scores, it would necessa-
rily have to state in print that some school rates a "zero"-which un-
doubtedly would make that school very unhappy.
The fact that some school will always be assigned a score of "zero,"
however, is symptomatic of a much deeper problem: because of the way
U.S. News assigns them, its overall scores have no inherent meaning. In
fact, the score assigned to a given school in any given computational run
will depend entirely on the choice of schools to be ranked in that run.
Applying exactly the same methodology to compute overall scores for
Yale, Stanford, and Harvard and no others, for example, would result in




Does Harvard deserve an "overall score" of zero? Probably not. Does
any other ABA-accredited school? Probably not either.
As a result, when U.S. News awards Yale a 100 and Harvard a 91,102
the size of the difference has no inherent meaning. It does not mean that
Harvard is only 91% as good as Yale. It does not mean that a Harvard
legal education is only 91% as effective as a Yale legal education. It does
not mean that a Harvard law graduate is only 91% as likely to meet em-
ployers' standards as a Yale law graduate. There is no way of determin-
ing, based solely on the size of the difference, whether the purported
difference ought to affect any decision we are trying to make. Assume
that a prospective student is trying to decide between Harvard and Yale.
She prefers Boston to New Haven as a place to live, but notes that Yale
has an overall score of 100, Harvard an overall score of 91. Is this nine-
point difference meaningful enough that she should choose Yale over
Harvard because of the difference in the quality of the schools? Or is it
small enough that she should make the decision based on location? We
have no way of knowing.
101. See id. at 46-47.
102. Id. at 44.
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The same is true of any other difference between overall scores. The
school at which I teach, for example-Loyola Law School, Los Angeles-
is awarded an overall score of 44.103 How much "better" is UCLA, which
is awarded an overall score of 71?1°4 The difference between UCLA and
Loyola is 27 overall score points, three times larger than the difference
between Yale and Harvard. Does this mean we should take the amount
by which Yale is "better" than Harvard and multiply it by three to deter-
mine how much "better" UCLA is than Loyola? Does such an operation
have any meaning? Ultimately, overall scores tell one something about
direction, but very little about magnitude. We need to delve into the dis-
aggregated data-median LSATs, GPAs, reputations, or whatever it is we
really care about-to figure out how schools are different and whether
we think those differences are meaningful. Since U.S. News does not
publish all of the data it uses in computing those scores, this can be a
problem.
B. VALIDITY
Reliability (or lack thereof) is irrelevant if the ranks or overall scores
do not actually measure anything one cares about-that is, if the U.S.
News scoring system is not "valid." I begin this section with a platitude:
the U.S. News rankings are useful only to the extent that one values the
same things the U.S. News methodology implicitly values, and gives them
the same weight. If you are an employer, for example, you may not care
about student/teacher ratios or expenditures per student. Your bottom-
line question is more likely: "How many students of the quality my firm
requires will I find at this school?" In deciding where to interview, you
may find median LSATs more useful than U.S. News rank. The size of
the school, and therefore the depth of the talent pool it offers, may also
be relevant. Or perhaps you are a prospective law student. If so, again,
the information you use to make your decision should depend on what
you care about. Students who simply want to attend the most prestigious
school possible should focus on reputation, not U.S. News "rank." Stu-
dents who aim to become big firm partners in a particular city might be
better off looking at the hiring and partnering histories of big firms in that
city (this article will tell you how below). Students who just want a law
school where they can learn and enjoy learning the law should probably
set U.S. News aside; instead, they should sit in on classes at schools with
good reputations for teaching.'0 5
To introduce my discussion of whether the U.S. News measures are
"valid," I return to the questions with which I began this article: why is
103. Id. at 45.
104. Id. at 44.
105. Based on student survey data, THE PRINCETON REVIEW'S 2007 BEST 170 LAW




Yale given an overall score nine points higher than Harvard? 10 6 And why
is Stanford ranked above Harvard? 10 7 If we understand the parts of the
U.S. News system that account for these results, we may get a better sense
of whether U.S. News correctly measures something of interest.
My spreadsheet allows me to determine which input factors give Yale
and Stanford a scoring advantage, and by how much. In a Harvard-Yale
match-up, the nine-point overall score difference is attributable to U.S.
News's twelve input variables in the amounts set forth in Table 1.108 Each
number is given in overall score points-that is, each number estimates
how much of the nine-point overall score difference is attributable to dif-
ferences in that variable.
TABLE 1: HARVARD V. YALE: HARVARD ADVANTAGE (+)
OR SHORTFALL (-)
Library +0.8
Employment at nine months +0.2
Median LSAT +0.1
Bar pass ratio indicator +0.1
Academic assessment 0.0
Employment at graduation 0.0





"Educational" expenses per student -7.5
Total overall score difference -9.0
Table 1 thus tells us that 7.5 points of the 9.0 point overall score differ-
ence is attributable to differences in COLA-adjusted "educational" ex-
penses per student. Harvard gets a 0.1 bonus for its higher median LSAT
(173 as opposed to 172) but loses 0.9 overall score points for its lower
median UGPA (3.81 as opposed to 3.88). It gets a 0.8 bonus for the fact
that its library is twice the size of Yale's and small bonuses for its slightly
better nine-month employment and bar passage rates, but takes a cumu-
lative 1.8 point hit for its lower COLA-adjusted other expenses per stu-
1 Stanford 6 Washington and Lee
2 Chicago 7 BYU
3 Virginia 8 Michigan
4 Georgetown 9 Pennsylvania
5 Loyola Los Angeles 10 Northwestern
See THE PRINCETON REVIEW, Best Law Schools: Ranked, Best Overall Academic Experi-
ence, available at http://www.princetonreview.com/law/research/rankingDetails.asp?topic
ID-2 (last visited May 19, 2007).





dent, higher acceptance rate, lower lawyer reputational score, and higher
student/faculty ratio.
These numbers raise obvious questions about the validity of the two
overall scores. Do COLA-adjusted "educational" expenditures per stu-
dent measure something important enough to give Yale such an edge?
(Remember that as a result of this edge Yale would still be ranked first
even if its median LSAT were to drop to fourth tier levels.) Do we think
that a .07 difference in median UGPAs should be worth nine times as
much as a one-point LSAT differential? Other such questions will surely
occur to the reader.
The one-point (actually 0.8) overall score difference between Harvard
and Stanford is attributable to differences in these same variables in the
following amounts, again measured in overall score points:
TABLE 2: HARVARD V. STANFORD: HARVARD ADVANTAGE
(+) OR SHORTFALL (-)
Library +1.2
Academic assessment +0.7
Other expenses per student +0.6
Median LSAT +0.4
Employment at nine months +0.2
Lawyer assessment 0.0
Employment at graduation -0.1
Acceptance rate -0.2
Student/faculty ratio -0.4
Bar pass ratio -0.6
Median UGPA -0.7
"Educational" expenses per student -1.8
Total overall score difference 0 9  -0.8
Again, differences in "educational" expenditures per student make the
biggest difference in the two schools' relative U.S. News ranking. Inter-
estingly, notwithstanding its much larger student body, Harvard actually
spends more per student than Stanford.110 Because more of Harvard's
expenditures are classified as "indirect," however, and because "indirect"
expenditures are weighted lower in the U.S. News system than "direct"
expenditures (1.5% as opposed to 9.75%), Harvard loses a net 1.2 overall
score points by reason of expenditure differences. Harvard gets a 0.4 bo-
nus for its four-point edge in median LSATs (173 as opposed to 169),111
while losing 0.7 overall score points for a .06 deficit in median UGPAs
(3.81 as opposed to 3.87).112 Although Harvard's relevant bar pass rate is
significantly higher than Stanford's (95.9% as opposed to 91.8%),113 for
109. Individual components do not add up to -. 8 exactly because of rounding error.
110. See American Bar Association, supra note 57, at Table F-15.
111. See America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 150-51.
112. See id. at 144.
113. Id. at 44.
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U.S. News purposes, the California bar is treated as more difficult than
the New York bar. As a result, Harvard loses 0.6 overall score points for
its lower "bar pass ratio indicator." Indeed, Harvard would still lose
points for its "inferior" bar pass rate even if it were to report a perfect
(100%) New York pass rate. And so it goes.
Is this scoring valid? That is, does it correctly measure things we care
about? The remainder of this Part II.B explores in greater detail some of
the issues raised by specific input variables.
1. The reputational surveys
U.S. News's reputational surveys are the bane of every law dean's exis-
tence. Collectively, law schools spend millions each year on attempts to
influence survey outcomes. Without question, the surveys matter. If the
two surveys were to be dropped from U.S. News's ranking procedure and
law schools were to be ranked solely on the remaining ten more-or-less
objective variables, the dozen schools most helped (and the number of













In other words, based purely on U.S. News's non-reputational variables,
Toledo would be ranked 55th, not 96th-a stunning difference. 114
Conversely, the dozen schools most helped by inclusion of the two
reputational variables (and the number of ranks each would fall if those
variables were omitted) are the following:














I do not mean to suggest that schools in this second set are overranked
or that schools in the first are underranked. It may well be that each
deserves its reputation as measured by U.S. News. I mean only to suggest
that these two variables, given an aggregate weight of 40%, 115 really
matter.
On the plus side, the surveys represent direct attempts to measure
something about which many readers care a lot. So far as is apparent, the
scores returned by deans, law professors, lawyers, and judges are not
manipulated in any way by U.S. News before being averaged and re-
ported. The academic survey seems methodologically more plausible, al-
though more likely to be gamed by respondents; the response rate is quite
high and we have some sense of who the respondents are: "the law
school dean, dean of academic affairs, chair of faculty appointments, and
the most recently tenured faculty member at each law school accredited
by the American Bar Association.' 1 6 In the case of the survey of judges
and practitioners, unfortunately, we do not know how respondents are
chosen, the response rate is a worrisomely low 26%, and we know noth-
ing about the demographics of those who respond."17
The basic problem with reputational surveys, however, is that they only
work if the people or institutions being rated have reputations.11 8 It is
one thing to ask respondents to rate, for example, the President and Vice
President of the United States. It is another thing entirely to ask them to
rate the individual performances of each of one hundred senators, many
of whom are probably unknown even to well-read respondents, let alone
one hundred eighty law schools. I have long worried that the U.S. News
surveys might simply measure name recognition-that they might there-
115. Id.
116. Letter from Robert Morse, Director of Data Research, U.S. News & World Re-
port, to Richard Bales, Professor of Law, Chase School of Law (Sept. 29, 2005) (on file
with author).
117. America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 45. Brian Leiter asserts that
"one-third of the law firms surveyed by U.S. News are in New York City." Brian Leiter,
How the 2003-04 Results Differ from U.S. News, Brian Leiter's Law School Rankings,
http://www.leiterrankings.com/faculty/2003differencesusnews.shtml.
118. Leiter, supra note 116. U.S. News asks respondents to rate the "reputation" of the
law school as a whole. Brian Leiter states that the questionnaire mentions "faculty, pro-
grams, students, and alumni as possibly pertinent considerations." Id.
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fore be biased, for example, in favor of schools on the East Coast, 119
where a majority of respondents reside, or schools whose universities
have well-known athletic teams.
I have developed a simple tool both for testing such hypotheses and for
thinking more methodically about how properly to respond to U.S.
News's reputational survey. Assume that median LSATs of full-time stu-
dents are at least a rough indicator of the quality of law schools' student
bodies. 120 Assume further that a school that can attract a good student
body can probably also attract a faculty with a comparably good scholarly
reputation; a school that can attract an excellent student body, a faculty
with a comparably excellent scholarly reputation; and so on. If these as-
sumptions are approximately true, one can use median LSATs to gener-
ate a set of predicted reputational scores having the same means and
standard deviations as those actually reported by U.S. News. These
LSAT-predicted reputational scores are the scores survey respondents
would presumably return if (1) respondents were fully informed, (2) each
school's scholarly reputation and other reputational inputs were consis-
tent with the quality of its student body, and (3) median LSATs of full-
time students correctly measured student body quality. A table of LSAT-
predicted reputational scores, both peer and practitioner, is given in Ap-
pendix A to this Article.121
Using LSAT-predicted reputational scores to test for bias is roughly
equivalent to using multiple regression to perform the same tests, control-
ling for median LSATs and creating a dummy variable for the character-
istic being tested (for instance, location in the Eastern time zone). LSAT-
predicted reputational scores, however, are more intuitively accessible to
the mathematically challenged. Using this tool, I have tested a number of
hypotheses about survey bias and can report the following tentative
results. 122
(1) Law schools in the Eastern time zone do not appear to be systemat-
ically overranked. In fact, both academics and practitioners appear to
119. Brian Leiter has asserted that "[s]chools on the two coasts are usually at an advan-
tage in opinion surveys, because schools are more tightly clustered, geographically, and
faculty tend to know each other better, both professionally and socially." Brian Leiter,
Faculty Quality Rankings: Scholarly Reputation, 2003-2004, Brian Leiter's Law School
Rankings, http://www.leiterrankings.com/faculty/2003faculty-reputation.shtml.
120. A prior posted draft of this Article used the median LSATs of all students, not
merely full-time students, to generate LSAT-predicted reputational scores. Consistent
with U.S. News's current practice, the scores reported and analyses in this version of the
Article are based on the LSATs of full-time students only.
121. To generate "LSAT-predicted peer scores," the median LSATs of the various
schools were normalized using a forced mean and standard deviation equal to the actual
mean and standard deviation of U.S. News's reported peer assessments. A similar compu-
tation, using the actual mean and standard deviation of U.S. News's reported lawyer/judge
assessments, was performed to generate "LSAT-predicted practitioner scores."
122. The method used to reach these conclusions is simple: take the group of schools
being investigated (for example, law schools in the Eastern time zone), sum the apparent
over- or underrankings for those schools, divide by the number of schools in question to
determine their average over- or underranking, and use the conversion factors given in
Part III to convert the results into overall score points.
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evidence a slight bias against schools in the Eastern time zone, which ulti-
mately costs law schools in that zone an average of 0.31 overall score
points. (I want to emphasize that I am not asserting that survey respon-
dents are wrong. Law schools in the Eastern time zone may, on average,
be slightly worse than their median LSATs would indicate. I have no
reason to think so; I merely note the possibility. The same warning
should be read as accompanying each of the subsequent conclusions.)
(2) Law schools in the Central time zone appear, as a group, to be
significantly overranked, picking up an average of 0.92 overall score
points as a result. For most such schools, this means a net pickup of
about five ranks. What might explain this phenomenon? It is possible
that law schools in the Central time zone are, on average, significantly
better than their median LSATs would indicate. There is no obvious rea-
son to think so, but it is a possibility. My tentative hypothesis is rather
that such schools are close enough to the East Coast (where a majority of
survey respondents reside) to have name recognition, but not so close
that familiarity breeds contempt.
(3) The reputations of law schools within one hundred miles of New
York City exhibit a pattern that reinforces this hypothesis. The reputa-
tion leaders (Yale, Columbia, NYU, and Pennsylvania) are assigned ac-
tual scores close to their LSAT-predicted scores. The next group down,
however, gets slammed: Fordham (-0.4, -0.5), Cardozo (-0.7, -1.0), Brook-
lyn (-0.7, -0.7), Temple (-0.4, -0.2), Villanova (-0.5, -0.6).123 On average,
schools within one hundred miles of New York lose 1.68 overall score
points based on this apparent underranking-of which 0.76 is attributable
to academics and 0.92 to lawyers and judges. It would appear that good-
but-not-top schools located in or near the City suffer seriously by com-
parison with reputation leaders in the same market. Respondents have
heard of them, but judge them adversely in comparison to their better-
known competitors.
(4) Law schools in the Pacific and far western time zones appear to be
systematically underranked by both academics and lawyers, losing an av-
erage of 0.88 overall score points as a result, of which about two-thirds is
attributable to academics. Again, for most such schools, this means a net
loss of about five ranks. My tentative hypothesis is that many such
schools lack name recognition on the East Coast.
(5) The possibility that name recognition is a factor in the reputational
surveys is bolstered by yet another finding: schools named after the state
within which they are located, regardless of whether public or private,
appear to be overranked nationwide, picking up an average of 1.26 over-
all score points as a result. Of the seven schools in the top one hundred
123. Each school's apparent underranking is given in reputational score points. Aca-
demics, for example, assign Cardozo a 2.7; its LSAT-predicted peer reputational score, by
contrast, is 3.4. Lawyers and judges give Cardozo the same 2.7, a full 1.0 lower than its
LSAT-predicted lawyer reputational score. Had Cardozo been rated 3.4 by academics and
3.7 by lawyers and judges, its overall score would have been 9 points higher, moving it from
52nd to 34th in the rankings. See America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 44.
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both of whose actual scores exceed LSAT-predicted scores by .4 or more,
all but two are eponymically state schools.
Apparent peer Apparent lawyer/
overranking judge overranking
Florida .5 .5
Indiana Indianapolis .4 .6
Iowa .5 .5
Miami .5 .4
North Carolina .6 .6
Stanford .6 .4
UC Berkeley .7 .5
It is possible that these schools have better faculty scholarship, on aver-
age, than their median LSATs would predict. Alternatively, or perhaps in
addition, it is possible that law schools named after states get a reputa-
tional boost because state names are immediately recognized.
By contrast, of the eleven schools in the top one hundred both of
whose actual scores are lower than LSAT-predicted scores by .4 or more,
only one has a name that explicitly identifies it as a state school.
Apparent peer Apparent lawyer/
underranking judge underranking
Alabama -. 6 -. 5
Brooklyn -. 7 -. 7
BYU -. 6 -. 4
Cardozo -. 7 -1.0
Fordham -. 4 -. 5
George Mason -. 6 -. 5
Loyola Los Angeles -. 5 -. 4
Northeastern -. 7 -. 8
Rutgers Camden -. 5 -. 6
Toledo -. 7 -. 6
Villanova -. 6 -. 6
(6) Finally, if name recognition is a factor, athletic prowess is clearly
not by itself enough, as the foregoing list demonstrates. Neither the Ala-
bama Crimson Tide nor the Villanova Wildcats ensure their law schools
reputational scores commensurate with their median LSATs.
I want to emphasize once more that I am not asserting that any of the
schools listed above are actually over- or underranked. I am merely at-
tempting to detect patterns. My conclusions are tentative, and I hope
that others will analyze the data set forth in Appendix A more fully. I
suggest, however, that in completing U.S. News surveys it may be useful to
look at LSAT-predicted reputational scores and be more conscious of why
one deviates from them, up or down-particularly with respect to schools
about which one has incomplete information. In other words, a conscien-
tious respondent might begin with the relevant column in Appendix A
and deviate from each school's LSAT-predicted score only for good
reason.
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Returning to Yale, Stanford, and Harvard, we find that Yale and Stan-
ford are apparently overrated, and that Harvard is slightly overrated by
academics but underrated by lawyers.




Harvard +.1 -. 1
What should we make of this? It is possible, of course, that Yale's and
Stanford's student bodies are actually better than their median LSATs
would indicate. This issue is further explored in the next section. The
more likely explanation, however, is that Yale's and Stanford's faculties
are viewed as better than their student bodies, at least as measured by
median LSATs, while Harvard's is not. Is such a view warranted? If one
credits Brian Leiter's Faculty Quality Rankings, the answer is "yes" with
respect to Yale, "partially" with respect to Stanford.12 4 If one uses Social
Science Research Network (SSRN) downloads as an indicator of current
scholarly visibility, the answer is clearly "no" with respect to both.12 5 In
any event, why practitioners would be influenced by scholarship in their
survey responses is not clear.
Regardless, in reading the U.S. News rankings critically, we still need to
decide whether whatever it is that causes reputational scores to deviate
from LSAT-predicted scores is relevant to anything we care about. If we
are academics, we generally do care about faculties' scholarly reputations.
If we are employers, we may not-and certainly not to the same extent.
If we are prospective students, our reactions may depend on what we are
looking for in a law school. If the problem appears, at least partly, to be
one of geographic bias or name recognition, we may want to discount it.
2. Student body quality
The quality of the students a law school can attract is probably the
single most important consideration for law firms making interviewing
and hiring decisions. It should also be important to prospective students;
the quality of one's legal education often depends as much on one's inter-
actions with other students as it does on one's interactions with profes-
124. See Brian Leiter, Faculty Quality Rankings: Scholarly Reputation, 2003-2004,
Brian Leiter's Law School Rankings, http://www.leiterrankings.com/faculty/2003faculty-
reputation.shtml.
125. Many law professors post their papers in electronic format on the SSRN. Inter-
ested readers can then read abstracts of the posted papers and download any they wish to
read in their entirety. As of May 1, 2007, Harvard ranked first in both total and "recent"
(last twelve months) downloads. Social Science Research Network, SSRN Top U.S. Law
Schools, http://hq.ssrn.com/Rankings/Ranking-display.cfm?TMY-glD=2&TRN-glD=13
(last visited May 22, 2007). Stanford ranked fourth in total downloads; Yale seventh. Id.
See also Bernard S. Black & Paul L. Caron, Ranking Law Schools: Using SSRN to Mea-
sure Scholarly Performance, 81 IND. L. J. 83 (2006) (discussing the use of SSRN downloads
to measure scholarly performance).
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sors. For prospective faculty, student body quality affects the level at
which one can effectively teach. Some academics care about this; others
do not.
The U.S. News methodology includes three variables intended to mea-
sure student body quality, which U.S. News labels "selectivity": median
LSATs, median UGPAs, and acceptance rates.126 What do these three
variables tell us about the quality of the student bodies at Harvard, Yale,
and Stanford?
Harvard Yale Stanford
Median LSAT 173 172 169
Median UGPA 3.81 3.88 3.87
Acceptance rate 11.5% 6.2% 7.8%
Here are the same figures translated into overall score points with
Harvard as the baseline:
Yale Stanford
Median LSAT -0.1 -0.4
Median UGPA +0.9 +0.7
Acceptance rate +0.3 +0.2
Total +1.1 +0.5
In other words, according to U.S. News, Yale's student body is sufficiently
superior to Harvard's to warrant awarding Yale a full extra overall score
point. Stanford's student body is sufficiently superior to Harvard's to
warrant awarding Stanford half of an extra overall score point. Is this
scoring valid?
The most obvious problem with U.S. News's methodology is that it
gives almost no credit for higher LSATs at the top end. Although
Harvard's entering class has a median LSAT four points higher than Stan-
ford's, Harvard gets a grand total of 0.4 overall score points for the differ-
ence. By contrast, elsewhere in the spreadsheet the one point difference
between a 153 and a 154 is worth 1.9 overall score points. This difference
in treatment is impossible to justify. Either LSATs matter, or they do
not.
This is a serious problem. I assume that U.S. News will fix it-that is,
that U.S. News will eventually use the median LSATs themselves, not
their percentile equivalents, as its LSAT input variable. Applying this fix
retroactively to the 2007 "selectivity" numbers and translating those num-
bers into overall score points with Harvard as the baseline, the immedi-
ately preceding table would look like this:




Median LSAT -0.5 -2.0
Median UGPA +0.8 +0.7
Acceptance rate +0.3 +0.2
Total +0.6 -1.1
With this change, Harvard's student body is deemed better than Stan-
ford's, although still not as good as Yale's. Indeed, in my spreadsheet
Harvard moves into second place overall ahead of Stanford. In the Top
10, NYU drops from fourth to fifth and UC Berkeley from eighth to
tenth, and Duke moves up to join Berkeley in a tie for tenth.
Fixing this problem and making no further changes in U.S. News's
methodology results in the following ranking changes across the top 100
law schools:





Cardozo, Duke, Emory, Harvard +1
All other schools 0
Arizona State, BC, Cincinnati, Florida State, -1
Hawaii, Lewis & Clark, Mercer, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Northeastern, NYU, Pennsylvania State,
Pepperdine, San Francisco, Santa Clara, Stanford, Temple,
Toledo, U Washington, William & Mary, Wisconsin
UC Berkeley -2
Iowa, UC Davis -3
Better. But are we prepared to declare U.S. News's corrected measure to
be a valid measure of student quality? I, for one, am not.
LSATs have many well-known problems. Nevertheless, they have
three major virtues: (1) they are nationally uniform, (2) they are one of
the best predictors of first-year law school grades (which means they
measure at least some part of what law professors measure when they
grade), and (3) they are statistically "reliable." When I was a big-firm
hiring partner, I relied heavily on median LSAT figures in assessing law
schools with which I was not familiar.
Like LSATs, UGPAs also measure something we care about. David
Thomas has concluded that, at least at one school, UGPAs are almost as
good a predictor of first-year law school grades as LSATs.127 There are
major problems, however, with using UGPAs to make national compari-
sons. First, undergraduate grading scales vary dramatically from school
to school and major to major. In 2003, Dr. Stuart Rojstaczer of Duke
127. David A. Thomas, Predicting Law School Academic Performance from LSAT
Scores and Undergraduate Grade Point Averages: A Comprehensive Study, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.
J. 1007, 1018-19 (2003).
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University collected GPA data from 30 undergraduate institutions.128
Recent average GPAs at those schools ranged from 2.51 to 3.47-an ex-
traordinary variation. The average GPA at the public undergraduate in-
stitutions he studied was only 2.97, while the average GPA at private
schools was 3.26-0.29 higher.129 Similarly, an article published in the
Virginian-Pilot in 2003 tabulated the percentage of "A" grades given at
Virginia undergraduate schools broken out by major. 130 At each, the per-
centage of "A" grades varied radically from major to major: at the Uni-
versity of Virginia, from 24.8% to 84.3%; at William and Mary, from
27.0% to 87.4%; at Old Dominion, from 18.4% to 76.6%; at Norfolk
State, from 7.4% to 76.8%.131
What this means is that, all else being equal, law schools that draw
primarily from private colleges are likely to be ranked higher by U.S.
News than law schools that draw primarily from state schools. This is true
even if median LSATs are identical. It also means that schools that are
willing to take risks on applicants in easy majors and discriminate against
applicants in tough majors will be higher-rated by U.S. News. And the
problem is not a small one. As discussed further in Part III below, each
0.097 bump in median UGPA gives a law school an additional overall
score point. The fact that a school draws predominately from public
schools may therefore cost a law school several overall score points. In
the middle ranges, this may drop a law school by a dozen ranks or more.
This is true even if its median LSATs are identical to an otherwise compa-
rable school that draws predominantly from private undergraduate
institutions.
What does Yale's 0.07 median UGPA edge over Harvard mean?1 32 We
do not know. It may reflect a superior student body. It may reflect a
difference in admissions philosophies. Or it may merely mean that Yale
draws more heavily from private schools. This might happen, for exam-
ple, if Yale were to draw more heavily from the Northeast, where private
schools predominate, and Harvard from a broader national pool, includ-
ing states where public universities are the norm. Would this mean that
Yale's student body is better than Harvard's? Not in my book.
There is another problem with using UGPAs to make interschool com-
parisons. Even if we can correct for differences in grading scales-as U.S.
News attempts in the case of bar passage rates-we still have to face the
fact that a 90th percentile grade from Pasadena City College (PCC) does
not mean the same thing as a 90th percentile grade from UC Berkeley.
By this I mean no criticism of PCC; it is a very good school. But getting a
128. Stuart Rojstaczer, Grade Inflation at American Colleges and Universities,
Gradelnflection.com, http://gradeinflation.com (last visited May 19, 2007).
129. Id.
130. See Grade Inflation at Virginia Universities, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 9, 2003, http://
hamptonroads.com/pilotonline/special/grades/index.html.
131. Percentage of A Grades by Universities' Departments, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 9,
2003, http://hamptonroads.compilotonline/special/grades/gradechart.html.
132. See America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 44.
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90th percentile grade at PCC is undeniably easier; the two schools' stu-
dent bodies are simply not comparable.
I therefore conclude-as I did when I was a hiring partner-that
UGPAs can only be used to compare students from the same school. Us-
ing UGPAs as U.S. News does introduces a significant potential source of
error into its rankings.
This brings us to the third variable U.S. News uses to measure student
body quality: acceptance rates.133 If we already know LSATs and
UGPAs, it is unclear what acceptance rates add. Assume that Schools A
and B have identical median LSATs and UGPAs, are of equal size, and
are identical in every other respect. Assume, however, that School A
accepts 10% of its applicants, while School B accepts 15%. Is School A
"better" than School B? It may simply be that School A is a very popular
backup school, gets scads of applications, and only needs to accept 10%
of them to fill its classes. Perhaps School B is more geographically iso-
lated; only students that really want to go there apply. As a result, per-
haps School B needs to accept 15% of its applicants to fill its classes. Or
perhaps the reverse is true: School B, the backup school, needs to accept
more of its applicants because it loses so many to other schools. Or per-
haps School A advertises heavily to elicit more applications. Assuming,
again, that the two schools end up with identical median LSATs and
UGPAs, is it really the case that School A is "better" than School B in
any meaningful sense? I think not.
If we drop UGPAs and acceptance rates out of the system, Harvard's
student body appears to be slightly better than Yale's (173 median LSAT
versus 172) and significantly better than Stanford's (173 median LSAT
versus 169).134 Even this comparison, however, understates the attrac-
tiveness of Harvard's student body to employers, a major part of U.S.
News's audience.
Harvard's student body is not merely good, it is enormous. Based on
the publicly available data, Harvard is probably responsible for the legal
education of more than half of all U.S. students with LSATs of 173 or
higher. It dominates the high-end legal market nationwide. No other law
school even comes close. In 2002, I researched which law schools sup-
plied the most partners to the five then-largest law firms in Los Ange-
les.135 Although Los Angeles is more than 2,500 miles from Boston,
Harvard tied with University of Southern California (USC) for second,
just slightly behind University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). Yale
was a distant sixth, Stanford (a California school) an even more distant
eighth.
The problem with median LSATs (or UGPAs) is that they completely
obscure size differences. Larger schools have larger pools of talent out of
which to hire. Median LSATs are relevant for many purposes. To ac-
133. See id. at 45.
134. See id. at 144, 146, 150-51.
135. See supra Part II.B.2.
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count for differences in size, however, a different statistic is needed. I
propose either the 50th or the 100th LSAT. To compute a median LSAT,
one lines LSATs up in order and finds the middle one. To compute a
school's 100th LSAT, one does the same, but counts down to number 100.
What a school's 100th entering LSAT tells is that the school's entering
class contains at least one hundred students with that LSAT or higher.
This is the pool likely to be of greatest interest to large law firms. It is
also the pool likely to supply a significant portion of that school's aca-
demic student leadership-its law review editors, moot court board mem-
bers, and the like.
Schools' 50th and 100th LSATs are not publicly available. They can be
estimated by interpolation, however, using published 75th and 25th per-
centile LSATs and enrollment data. I have made such estimates for the
top one hundred United States schools, ranked by estimated 100th
LSAT.136 The results appear in Appendix B, which might be subtitled,
"where to go to find large pools of good law graduates." For at least
some employers, the data in Appendix B may be of greater relevance to
decisions about where to interview than anything published by U.S. News.
Interestingly, estimated 100th LSATs do a better job of predicting the
source of Los Angeles big-firm partners as among Harvard, Yale, and
Stanford-the top non-local suppliers-than any statistic currently pub-
lished by U.S. News.
Estimated Partners in 5





Prospective students often care a lot about a school's placement suc-
cess. Employers probably care much less; prospective faculty, on aver-
age, very little. U.S. News uses three variables to measure placement
success, weighted as follows: the percentage of graduates who have jobs
at graduation (4%), the percentage who have jobs nine months after
graduation (14%), and "bar passage ratio indicators" (2%). 13 7 The ques-
tion, as always, is: are these variables reliable and valid? That is, do they
correctly measure something we care about, and do they do so without
significant random error? The short answer in each case is "no," for a
variety of reasons.
136. See American Bar Association, supra note 56, at Table I-1. For the purposes of
this calculation 75th percentile and 25th percentile LSATs for all students and total first
year enrollment were used. Estimated 100th LSATs were computed using the equation:
Est 100th LSAT = 75%LSAT + (1/2-200[Enr.) * (75%LSAT -25%LSAT)
The equation used to estimate 50th LSATs was:
Est 50th LSAT = 75%LSAT + (1/2-100/Enr.) * (75%LSAT -25%LSAT)
137. America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 45.
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I begin with the two employment variables. For prospective students,
the most important thing to keep in mind is that neither measures law-
related jobs. Flipping burgers counts. U.S. News necessarily uses the
same nine-month employment data tracked by the ABA.138 Using any
other numbers would require law schools to submit statistics they do not
already compile; compliance would probably be low. The ABA's em-
ployment numbers, in turn, are not limited to law-related jobs-nor can
they fairly be. 13 9 Many students, particularly in evening programs, obtain
law degrees to enhance their performance in non-legal careers. Counting
them as unemployed would ignore the very reasons they went to law
school. Counting non-legal jobs as employment, however, seriously limits
the validity of the employment variables for ranking purposes.
Several additional factors tend to distort the first employment variable,
employment rates at graduation. Three sets of students are likely to
count as employed in these numbers: (1) students who have been offered
full-time jobs out of big-firm summer programs, (2) evening students who
already hold jobs, and (3) students who have worked part-time for
smaller firms while in school and been invited to stay on after graduation.
To the extent that employment-at-graduation figures measure big-firm of-
fers, they measure something many prospective students do care about.
But it is often impossible to determine the extent to which this is true.
Schools with evening programs are likely to report higher employment-
at-graduation rates, since evening students are generally already em-
ployed. In addition, more students are likely to have jobs at graduation if
the school is located in a major legal center. On the other hand, to the
extent a school's graduates go into public interest jobs, its employment-
at-graduation numbers will probably be lower, since public interest orga-
nizations often prefer to wait until graduates have passed the bar before
extending offers. Finally, graduates in states with tough bar examinations
are generally advised to study full-time for the bar; graduates in states
with easier bar examinations are more likely to begin work immediately.
And, of course, more than a quarter of all schools do not report employ-
ment-at-graduation numbers at all; U.S. News simply makes up numbers
for them. For all of these reasons, it is unclear how much useful informa-
tion employment-at-graduation numbers actually contain.
Unfortunately, although they account for 14% of U.S. News's overall
scores, 140 the nine-month employment rates are even less meaningful.
Federally guaranteed law school loans become payable six months after
graduation. Typically, only graduates who are independently wealthy or
have spouses or parents willing to support them can afford to remain un-
employed at this point. (Remember, flipping burgers counts as employ-
ment.) Not surprisingly, in the 2007 issue, the median reported nine-
138. Id.
139. See American Bar Association, ABA 2005 Annual Questionnaire Part I, at 4.
140. See America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 45.
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month employment figure was 93%.141 For most schools in the top one
hundred, therefore, the entire game on this variable was played out in the
remaining 7%. Harvard beat out both Yale and Stanford, reporting a
99.5% nine-month employment rate-0.6% higher than the other
schools' 98.9% rates. 142 For this, Harvard got 0.2 of overall score credit-
twice as much credit as it got for the fact that its median LSAT was 173
while Yale's was only 172. Why did Harvard perform slightly "better" on
this variable? The answer is unclear, but it seems unlikely that it would
be relevant to anyone making any kind of decision about law schools.
Given the incredibly small differences among most top 100 schools on
this variable, the single biggest determinant of nine-month employment
figures was probably the amount of time each law school devoted to man-
aging this figure. From an educational perspective, such time was com-
pletely wasted. But schools that ignored the issue were penalized by U.S.
News. As is discussed in greater detail in Part III, schools gained or lost
more points in the rankings by reason of the nine-month employment vari-
able than by reason of any other. And this is true even if one excludes an
apparent clerical error which, by my computation, cost one school 18
overall score points.143 Did these differences measure anything of rele-
vance to anyone? For the most part, no.
There is one further reason that U.S. News's employment variables do
not tell a particular student much about her employment prospects if she
attends a particular school: a student's employment prospects generally
depend far more on the student than on the school she chooses. A really
good student attending a mid-ranked school will probably graduate near
the top of the class and get the big-firm job she wants. If the same stu-
dent attends a top-ranked school, she is less likely to graduate near the
top of the class; her chances of getting that big-firm job may even decline.
Judicial clerkships and law teaching positions are exceptions to this gen-
eral rule. School reputation matters a lot for these jobs; the U.S. News
employment figures, however, are completely irrelevant. In addition, if a
student wants to attend school in one part of the country but practice
elsewhere, attending a school with higher name recognition is likely to
help getting the first job in that other part of the country. But again,
employment figures do not tell anything about name recognition.
By contrast, U.S. News's third "placement success" variable-bar pas-
sage-is clearly important. Like employment rates, however, bar passage
rates generally tell more about the quality of a school's student body than
they do about the likelihood that a particular student will pass the bar.
Stronger students tend to pass the bar regardless of where they go to
school. Weaker students tend not to. Two further problems confound
bar passage rate statistics. First, evening students commonly do not quit
their jobs to study for the bar. As a result, at least at my school, they tend
141. See id. at 44-47.
142. Id. at 55.
143. The school has asked not to be identified.
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to do worse than day students, pulling down the school's overall bar pas-
sage rate. Second, a common technique schools use to boost bar passage
rates is to "academically disqualify" (that is, flunk out) a larger portion of
their student body, typically after the first year. Academic disqualifica-
tion rates are not published by U.S. News. The fact that 'Sink or Swim
Law School' does better than 'We See You Through Law School' in bar
passage, however, may merely mean that 'Sink or Swim' flunks out a
larger portion of its class. If so, attending 'Sink or Swim' will not necessa-
rily boost a particular applicant's chances of passing the bar at all.
Finally, all three of U.S. News's "placement success" variables suffer
from the same technical problem. One expects input variables to be nor-
mally distributed. Roughly speaking, there should be a large number of
schools in the middle, with tails extending above and below the middle.
When one of the tails is truncated, odd things happen. I call this a "ceil-
ing" or "floor" effect-it arises whenever there is a line beyond which a
school's numbers cannot rise or fall. In the case of the U.S. News "place-
ment success" variables, that line is 100%; no school can report a rate
greater than 100% on any of these variables. The data suggest that top
schools clearly bump up against this ceiling and are penalized by it.
In Part III, this article introduces the concept of leading and lagging
variables, input variables in the U.S. News system that pull a school's
overall score up or down, respectively. For U.S. News's five top-ranked
schools, the placement success variables are almost all lagging-that is,
they almost invariably pull overall scores down. In the table that follows,
the amounts by which they do so are given in overall score points.
Employ. Employ. Bar pass
at grad. at 9 mos. ratio ind.
Columbia -0.1 -3.3 -0.3
Harvard -0.4 -3.9 -0.3
NYU -0.3 -3.2 -0.1
Stanford -0.4 -4.2 +0.3
Yale -0.8 -5.4 -0.5
The reason for this is a ceiling effect: the top-ranked schools are so
close to 100% that they bump up against that ceiling. The one exception
is Stanford's bar pass ratio indicator, which actually pulls Stanford's over-
all score up by 0.3. A school's bar pass ratio indicator measures how far
the school's bar pass-rate is from the average bar pass-rate for its jurisdic-
tion.144 The other four schools' bar pass rates are measured against the
New York average, which is moderately high (75%).145 Their distances
from that average therefore cannot get much larger than they already are.
Stanford's, however, is measured against the California average (61%).146
144. Id. at 45.
145. Internet Legal Research Group, 2007 Raw Data Law School Rankings: State
Overall Bar Pass Rate, http://www.ilrg.com/rankings/law/index.php/2/desc/StateOverall




Even though its reported bar pass rate is lower than any of the others', the
ceiling in California is further away from the average. As a result, Stan-
ford is not effectively constrained by that ceiling. In ranking the top five
law schools, therefore, Stanford is deemed to have outperformed all four
of the others in bar passage and, indeed, would still be deemed superior
in this regard even if the other four were to report perfect (100%) New
York bar pass rates.
I conclude that U.S. News's "placement success" variables do not really
measure much that its three primary audiences-employers, prospective
students, and prospective faculty members-actually care about. Inas-
much as they are accorded, in the aggregate, a weight of 20% in comput-
ing overall scores, this is a problem. I say this notwithstanding the fact
that these variables boost my own school's overall score by a total of 2.1
points.
A prospective student whose goal is to become a big-firm partner in a
particular city may wish to conduct her own research into the hiring and
partnering patterns of firms in that city. The technique is simple: take a
representative sample of firms in that city, then use Martindale-Hubble to
count the number of partners from each school who graduated in or after
some year, say twenty five years ago. I did this for Los Angeles four
years ago. My results:
Partners in the
















The foregoing numbers do not mean, of course, that one's chances of
making partner at a big Los Angeles firm are better if one attends Loyola
than if one attends Stanford. They do suggest, however, that attending
University of California Hastings or University of California Davis, both
of which are higher U.S. News-ranked than Loyola, will not necessarily
give a student any advantage. The same kind of analysis can be done for
any city in which a prospective student is interested.
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4. Expenditures per student
Expenditures per student make an enormous difference in the relative
ranking of otherwise comparable schools. They comprise 7.8 of the 9.0
overall score difference between Yale and Harvard and by themselves
push Stanford past Harvard in the U.S. News rankings. Indeed, if we
were to drop the two expenditure variables out of the computation alto-
gether, use median LSATs instead of their percentile equivalents, and
make no further changes to U.S. News's methodology, the top 10 law












Yale would beat Harvard by 0.8 of an overall score point-still coming in
first, but not by a nine-point margin; Harvard would move ahead of Stan-
ford; Chicago would tie with NYU instead of coming in two ranks behind;
and University of California Berkeley would move ahead of University of
Pennsylvania.
This hypothetical scoring seems at least as plausible as U.S. News's ac-
tual scoring and ranking; it is certainly more consistent with Brian
Leiter's rankings of faculty quality. 147 This, in turn, raises at least two
questions: first, whether the reported expenditure figures actually reflect
additional dollars spent on the J.D. programs U.S. News is ranking, and
second, whether any such additional dollars spent actually improve the
quality of those programs in a meaningful way.
(a) Do higher reported amounts actually reflect additional dollars spent
on J.D. programs?
As noted, at least some of the expenditures-per-student numbers used
by U.S. News appear to differ from those reported in the ABA Take-Offs.
Some of these inconsistencies, my spreadsheet suggests, are quite signifi-
cant. Unfortunately, the numbers used by U.S. News are not publicly
available; it is therefore difficult to determine either the source of the
problem or how widespread the problem is. There is something troubling
about rankings based on secret numbers apparently inconsistent with
those reported to the law schools' accrediting authority. There is a very
147. See Brian Leiter, Faculty Quality Rankings: Scholarly Reputation, 2003-2004,




real potential that the U.S. News rankings may come to measure dishon-
esty-higher rankings indicating, among other things, a greater willing-
ness to fudge the numbers. But there is little more to be said about this
aspect of the problem; the remainder of the discussion therefore focuses
on how the ABA numbers themselves are computed.
U.S. universities and stand-alone law schools are commonly subject to
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for financial reporting
purposes. The expenditure numbers reported to the ABA, however, are
not based on GAAP at all. They are based instead on the rules each
school uses for internal budgeting purposes, and different schools use dif-
ferent rules.148 Nor is there any requirement that the rules used by a
given school remain consistent from year to year. We therefore begin
with a serious problem. In comparing two schools' "expenditures," or
even a single school's "expenditures" in one year with the same school's
"expenditures" in another, we may be comparing apples to oranges.
Three problems usefully illustrate the possibility that serious inconsis-
tencies may result from differences in accounting conventions. The first
is the treatment of capital expenditures. A capital expenditure, roughly
speaking, is an expenditure with a useful life of more than one year.149
Examples include purchases of new buildings, new technology systems,
new library books, and the like. (These can be very large numbers in
legal education.). For budgeting purposes, one alternative is to treat capi-
tal expenditures as expenses. They are, after all, cash-out-of-pocket. A
school that budgets on this basis and builds a new $30 million building
will report a $30 million expenditure in the year of payment. A second
possibility, available only if the school finances the acquisition with debt,
is to treat the repayment of the debt as the expenditure. Now the $30
million cost of the building will be reported as a series of expenditures
over the life of the debt, whatever that might be, as the principal amount
of the debt is paid off. A third possibility, which my school uses for build-
ings and equipment, is to depreciate capital assets on a straight-line basis
over their useful lives. For budgeting purposes, schools can choose any
useful life they want. For buildings, my school uses sixty years. Under
such a budgeting rule, the cost of a $30 million building would be re-
ported as a $500,000 expenditure each year for sixty years. A fourth pos-
sibility, common for state schools with respect to facility costs, is not to
charge the law school budget at all. My school uses this fourth conven-
tion for land acquisition costs. Each of these conventions results in very
different reported law school expenditures-for the same $30 million
building.
148. See American Bar Association, 2005 Annual Questionnaire Part 6, at 2 ("the ques-
tionnaire is designed for law schools with a wide variety of accounting and budgeting
practices").
149. See e.g., Theodore P. Seto, Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget Amendment That
Does What It Is Supposed to Do (And No More), 106 YALE L. J. 1449, 1485 n.128 (1997).
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The ABA's reporting instructions constrain the use of these conven-
tions to some extent. Use of the first-treating the entire cost as an ex-
penditure up front-is prohibited for "major capital projects,"150 defined
as "substantial remodeling and new buildings, including architectural and
engineering fees for those projects."'1 51 The second, 152 third,1 53 and
fourth 154 conventions are all explicitly authorized, even though they lead
to very different expenditure numbers. Equipment' 55 and library acquisi-
tions,156 however, must be expensed up front, regardless of how they are
treated in the school's actual budget. For this purpose, unfortunately,
"equipment" is undefined. Does it include a new building's computer
and communications infrastructure? Its plasma screens and
Smartboards? Its elevators? Its heating and air conditioning systems?
The answers are unclear. It would not be surprising to discover that dif-
ferent schools interpret the ABA's instructions in different ways.
A related problem arises from the fact that for many older schools, the
value of buildings is omitted entirely from the expenditure computation.
A school that owns its buildings free and clear and has already amortized
any associated costs gets no credit at all in the ABA and U.S. News
figures for what may be a spectacular campus. A school that merely rents
its buildings or has purchased them but not yet paid off any associated
debt, by contrast, may report its rent or debt service as expenditures, and
thereby be treated as "better" for U.S. News ranking purposes than an
otherwise identical school that owns its buildings free and clear. Whether
a law school has adequate classroom space, space for faculty and student
organization offices, and the like is obviously relevant to the quality of
150. American Bar Association, 2005 Annual Questionnaire Part 6, at 13 ("Includes
Operating Funds Only. We are not seeking capital expenditures which are reported in
Capital, Endowment, and Reserves later in this questionnaire."); id. at 35 (with regard to
"Gifts, Endowment and Reserve Funds," Line F, "Please state actual expenditures during
the year for major capital projects . .
151. Id. at 35.
152. Id. at 12 ("Interest and Debt Service Payments. Report expenditures only if they
are included in the law school budget directly or charged to the law school."); id. at 18.
153. Id. at 7 ("Funds designated for 'depreciation' should be included in Line K.1 if
charged against the law school."). Presumably, the reference to Line "K.1" is a typograph-
ical error, intended as a reference to Line "J.1" in the current questionnaire.
154. Id. ("Many schools will have few of the categories in this section filled out. This
will particularly be true of public institutions.").
155. Id. at 10 ("Library Equipment: Purchase, rental, repair, maintenance."); id. at 11
("Indirect Expenditures: In this category, include all relevant personnel, fringe benefits,
supplies and equipment expenditures."); id. at 16 ("Library equipment (purchase, rental,
repair, maintenance ...)"); id. at 17 ("Equipment Purchase, Rental, Repair and Mainte-
nance"); id. at 18 ("Indirect Expenditures and Overhead (In this category include all rele-
vant personnel, fringe benefits, supplies and equipment expenditures)"); id. at 34 ("Line F.
This question asks for the actual expenditures for major capital projects. Generally, equip-
ment purchases should not be reported here; rather in the Expenditures section, line H-
5."); id. at 35 ("Please state actual expenditures during the year for major capital
projects.... Equipment purchases and the like should generally be reported on line H-5 of
the Expenditure section.").
156. Id. at 10 ("Acquisitions of Other Library Information Resources. Any non serial
library information resources not reported in G.1 and G.2, including books, non-serial mi-
crofilms, CD-ROMS not reported above, audio-visual, and other.").
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the experience it is able to offer its students. Because of the way "ex-
penditures" are computed, however, U.S. News does not actually measure
this educational input.
A third set of potential inconsistencies arises in accounting for expendi-
tures made out of restricted or dedicated revenue sources. The purpose
of budgeting is to make sure that a school does not spend more than it
should. Reimbursed expenditures or expenditures made out of restricted
revenues are therefore sometimes treated as off-budget-neither the rev-
enues nor the associated expenditures show up in the budget at all. An
example at my school is work/study funding. Only the portion of work/
study payments contributed by the law school is treated as an "expendi-
ture." An alternative way to account for exactly the same revenue and
expenditure streams would be to include federal work/study subsidies as
revenues and treat the full amount of all work/study payments as expend-
itures. Whether a school uses the first convention or the second will sub-
stantially affect its reported work/study expenditures for U.S. News
purposes.
A similar anomaly arises in accounting for visiting faculty. Assume
that a faculty member from School A visits at School B. School A there-
fore hires a visitor to fill the absent faculty member's slot in the interim.
Quite commonly, the absent faculty member will remain on School A's
payroll; School B will simply reimburse School A for her salary and bene-
fits for the duration of the visit. School A will therefore continue to carry
her salary and benefits as an expenditure, albeit fully reimbursed. But
School A will also pay for the absent faculty member's replacement. In
effect, for expenditure purposes School A double-counts the cost of the
absent faculty member's slot. Schools with high volumes of visiting
faculty are likely to have a correspondingly high incidence of double-
counting of faculty salaries and benefits.
Similar problems arise in accounting for joint degree programs and
joint appointments. In the typical joint J.D.-M.B.A. program, for exam-
ple, the law school gets the tuition for law courses, the business school the
tuition for business courses. This can be accounted for in either of two
ways. The business school tuition can be treated as having been paid di-
rectly to the business school-that is, as not passing through the law
school budget at all. Alternatively, the student's tuition may be treated
as having been paid first to the law school and then by the law school to
the business school. In the latter case, the business school tuition pay-
ment will show up as a law school "expenditure," boosting the school's
expenditures per student. Similarly, the compensation of a professor with
a joint appointment can be paid separately by each school, in which case
only part of her compensation will flow through the law school's budget.
Or, the second school can pay its portion of her compensation to the law
school, which then makes the actual payments to the employee. In the




My purpose here is not to offer a comprehensive guide to law school
budgetary rules and practices. The foregoing examples are intended
merely as illustrations of a larger problem: because budgeting conven-
tions were never designed to facilitate interschool comparisons, even
large differences in reported expenditures per student may merely reflect
differences in accounting practices, not differences in actual dollars spent.
Setting aside the problem of accounting consistency, we still need to
ask: expenditures for what? For ABA reporting purposes, and therefore
for U.S. News purposes, whether an expenditure is included as a "law
school expenditure" is determined, in the first instance, simply by looking
at whether it is included in the law school's budget.157 This, in turn, is an
internal administrative question, resolved in different ways at different
schools. For example, the largest on-campus clinic at my school-with a
half-dozen faculty-like staff members whose principal function is to su-
pervise students in their clinical work-is organized as a separate corpo-
rate entity. As a result, its expenditures do not appear in the law school's
budget and its employees are not counted as "faculty"; the law school
therefore gets no ranking credit for the educational opportunities it af-
fords. If my school were to operate the very same clinic within the uni-
versity's corporate shell, by contrast, its expenditures and faculty would
count, potentially boosting the school's ranking.
Law schools cannot be completely arbitrary about what they include in
their reporting budgets. The ABA requires that they exclude expendi-
tures for so-called "auxiliary" enterprises, which it defines by enumera-
tion: "e.g., vending machines, bookstore, dining halls, and law school
dorms. '158 The ABA questionnaire requires that schools report only net
revenues from such enterprises and concludes: "[s]ince you are reporting
the net revenue, do not report any expenditures related to this cate-
gory. ' 159 The questionnaire does not, however, exclude expenditures for
academic programs other than the J.D. program. Many U.S. law schools
offer extensive LL.M. (Master of Laws), S.J.D. (Doctor of Juridical Sci-
ence), certificate, and Continuing Legal Education (CLE) programs.
Some offer M.B.T. programs for non-lawyers; others offer paralegal
training programs. Such non-J.D. programs are not "auxiliary" enter-
prises for ABA reporting purposes. If the non-J.D. program is included
in the law school's budget, all of that program's expenses are included in
the expenditure figures reported to the ABA and U.S. News, even if the
expenses are really being incurred, in whole or in part, to educate non-
J.D. students.
The next step in computing expenditures per student is to divide "ex-
penditures" by the number of students. We therefore need a definition of
157. Id. at 4 ("Expenditures are to be reported if they are in the law school budget
regardless of the source of income that supports the expenditure").
158. Id. at 22. I want to thank Laurie Newitz, Chief Financial Officer of Brooklyn Law
School, for correcting an error in a prior draft of this article with respect to the proper




"student." In computing its expenditures-per-student numbers, the ABA
includes FIT students in all of the law school's degree programs (for in-
stance, LL.M.'s, S.J.D.'s, M.B.T.'s, paralegals). U.S. News computes ex-
penditures per student differently, dividing each school's total
"expenditures," including expenditures on non-J.D. programs, by the
number of FTE J.D. students.1 60 This is clearly wrong; U.S. News's
method significantly overstates J.D. expenditures per student at schools
with large non-J.D. programs. A table of the percentage by which each
school's J.D. expenditures per student are overstated as a result of this
error is given in Appendix C to this Article. NYU's expenditures per
student, for example, appear to be overstated by 44% in U.S. News's
computations as a result.
U.S. News then breaks th resulting expenditures per student into two
categories. The more heavily-weighted variable (9.75%), which U.S.
News calls "expenditures per student for instruction, library, and support-
ing services," is based on the ABA "direct expenditure" numbers, with
"tuition reimbursements, grants, and loan forgiveness" removed. 161 The
less heavily-weighted variable (1.5%), which it calls "expenditures per
student on all other items including financial aid," includes ABA "indi-
rect expenditures" plus "tuition reimbursements, grants, and loan for-
giveness. ' 162 The labels U.S. News uses imply that its more heavily
weighted expenditure variable reflects educational inputs and that its less
heavily weighted expenditure variable does not. Each is only partly true,
and, again, the extent to which each is true is likely to vary significantly
from school to school. To understand what each variable actually repre-
sents, one must first understand how the ABA differentiates between "di-
rect" and "indirect" expenditures.
"Indirect" expenditures are defined as expenditures in eleven catego-
ries: (1) "building operation and maintenance," (2) "utilities (other than
telephone)," (3) "security," (4) "interest and debt service payments," (5)
"assessments by the university for specific university services," (6) "indi-
rect or overhead charges by the university," (7) "overhead on grants/con-
tracts or the like retained by the university," (8) "overhead or charges of
any kind assessed by the university against private giving, endowment
funds or the like," (9) "surplus retained by university," (10) "student fees
retained by the university," and (11) "other overhead-type expendi-
tures."'1 63 All other expenses are treated as direct. U.S. News's "expendi-
tures per student for instruction, library, and supporting services,"
therefore includes expenditures for, among other things, fundraising,
public relations, alumni relations, career services, and computer infra-
160. Telephone Interview with Samuel Flanigan, Deputy Director of Data Research,
U.S. News & World Report (June 27, 2006).
161. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 2007 U.S. News Law Schools Statistical Survey, at
Questions 86-95.
162. Id. at Questions 96-97.
163. American Bar Association, 2005 Annual Questionnaire Part 6, at 18.
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structure-not what one necessarily thinks of when one thinks of core
educational expenditures.
Indirect expenditures, thus defined, fall into three basic groups: (1)
facility expenses (categories 1-4), (2) amounts paid to or retained by the
parent university (categories 5-10), and (3) "other overhead-type expend-
itures" (category 11). U.S. News then adds a fourth group, "tuition reim-
bursements, grants, and loan forgiveness," to complete its less heavily
weighted expenditure variable. 164 Two questions suggest themselves with
regard to this variable: first, whether it makes sense to give expenses in
these four categories a lower weight (1.5%) in the ranking computation
than other expenses (weighted at 9.75%); and second, whether it makes
sense to give such expenses any weight at all.
One might colorably argue that the quality of a law school's physical
plant merits more than a 1.5% weight. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
many ABA accreditation issues relate to physical plant. An inadequate
building limits course offerings, new faculty hiring, library resources,
high-tech teaching methods, student organizations, study facilities-the
list goes on and on.
The problem with giving facility expenses any greater weight-or in-
deed any weight at all-is that the numbers themselves are so inherently
problematic. Because of the accounting consistency problems discussed
above, the numbers are simply not comparable from school to school.
On the other hand, these very accounting consistency problems may ar-
gue in favor of not attempting to distinguish between the two types of
expenditures for ranking purposes. Is classroom technology part of the
"building?" If so, its costs will be low-weighted. If not, they will be given
full ranking credit. As noted, different schools may well report such costs
differently. And if the accounting consistency problems were not bad
enough on their own, the ABA's instructions with regard to such ex-
penses are so vague as to leave schools great leeway in reporting. Is the
receptionist at the front desk "security?" If so, his salary and benefits are
low-weighted. If not, they are given the same credit for ranking purposes
as a full professor's.
The second group of indirect expenditures-amounts paid to or re-
tained by the law school's parent university-raises equally serious inter-
school comparability problems. First, stand-alone law schools do not
report any such expenditures. Such schools instead report expenditures
on the same real inputs in some other category-direct or indirect. If
direct, stand-alone law schools may receive substantially greater credit
(9.75% as opposed to 1.5%) than university-affiliated law schools for
identical real inputs. Second, schools differ in the extent to which law
school revenues are used to subsidize other university programs. There is
no reason to treat a law school that pays a heavy annual subsidy to its
164. Telephone Interview with Samuel Flanigan, Deputy Director of Data Research,
U.S. News & World Report (June 27, 2006).
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university as "better" for ranking purposes than an otherwise identical
school that pays no such subsidy-but U.S. News's methodology does.
Third, even if we can get past the comparability problems created by
stand-alone schools and the use of law schools as funding sources for
other parts of a university, we still face major comparability problems in
assessing amounts paid to or retained by parent universities for services
actually provided to their law schools. Admissions, alumni relations, de-
velopment, grant management, information technology, payroll, place-
ment, public relations, recordkeeping, registration, and student accounts
are all functions sometimes provided by the law school, sometimes by the
parent university. If they are provided by the law school, the relevant
expenditures will be "direct" and will be counted in U.S. News's formula
at 9.75%. If they are provided instead by the university in return for a
fixed or formulaic amount paid to or retained by the university, that
amount will be "indirect," and therefore counted at only 1.5%. Identical
inputs, different treatments.
The ABA questionnaire partially addresses this problem by authorizing
recategorization of indirect expenses as "direct" in limited circumstances.
It states:
Ordinarily, include expenditures as direct law school expenditures
only if they are included in the law school 'budget' or under the con-
trol of the law school. Exceptions are rare, but may be made where
it is clear that the failure to include an item would be misleading....
[I]f the university . . . funds central services to the law school that
are, in most law schools, funded within the law school budget, it
might be misleading not to include those costs as direct law school
expenditures. Thus if development and alumni relations services are
provided to the law school by personnel paid by central university
funds but dedicated to providing services to the law school, the rea-
sonably allocated costs of those dedicated personnel (whether physi-
cally located in the law school or in a central university office) should
be included as a direct expense .... Similarly, if financial aid services
are provided to the law school and law students by personnel paid by
central university funds but dedicated to providing services to the
law school, the reasonably allocated costs of those dedicated person-
nel (whether physically located in the law school or in a central uni-
versity office) should be included as a direct expense .... 165
Exactly what portion of any formulary amount paid to or retained by a
university is paid or retained in exchange for any such services, however,
is commonly very unclear. Recategorization would typically require sig-
nificant extra work of a sophisticated nature by the person-often a cleri-
cal employee-filling out the questionnaire. One wonders how much
such recategorization actually occurs, and on how principled a basis. A
law school seeking to maximize its U.S. News ranking, of course, can re-
negotiate its deal with its university-recharacterizing the very same
165. American Bar Association, 2005 Annual Questionnaire Part 6, at 4-5.
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sums it has always paid to the university as payments for direct services.
It is unclear how many law schools have done so.
The ABA's final category of indirect expenses consists of "other over-
head-type expenditures," which, the questionnaire states, should include
"corporate taxes, profits or dividends distributed, or the like."'1 66 It is
difficult to understand why a law school that pays high taxes or distrib-
utes large dividends to its shareholders should be treated as "better" than
an otherwise identical law school that does not, but that is what U.S.
News's methodology does.
In any event, in 2004-2005 the percentage that "indirect expenditures"
comprised of "total expenditures" varied markedly across U.S. law
schools, ranging from zero to a high of 50%.167 Five law schools reported
no indirect expenses whatsoever; fifty-five law schools reported indirect
expenses of less than 10%. Eight law schools, by contrast, reported indi-
rect expenses in excess of 30%. Given these dramatic variations-which
seem very unlikely to reflect comparable variations in real inputs-and
the likelihood that such variations result instead from inconsistencies in
accounting or reporting, the division of expenses into direct and indirect
categories seems largely arbitrary. In sum, the assignment of different
weights to the two categories probably introduces substantial random er-
ror into U.S. News's rankings.
As an example, recall that Harvard actually spent more per student in
2003-2004 and 2004-2005 than Stanford. 168 Nevertheless, because a
larger percentage of Harvard's expenditures (21.87% as opposed to
11.02%) were reported as "indirect," Harvard lost a net 1.2 overall score
points to Stanford by reason of its "inferior" expenditures per student.
This factor by itself moved Stanford past Harvard into second place. 169
There is no evidence that Harvard's "inferior" numbers reflected any
meaningful inferiority.
The final group of expenses that U.S. News (but not the ABA) includes
in its lower-weighted expenditure variable consists of "tuition reimburse-
ments, grants, and loan forgiveness."' 170 The argument, presumably, is
that scholarships reflect tuition foregone, not real educational inputs. At
the extreme, a school could increase its tuition substantially while rebat-
ing the entire increase to its students in the form of scholarships. The
effect would be to boost the school's reported expenditures per student
without changing the amount actually spent on education by a single
penny. In addition, it appears that a significant portion of all law school
scholarships are now awarded to help manage schools' LSATs and
166. Id. at 11.
167. For purposes of the computations reported in this paragraph, "tuition reimburse-
ments, grants, and loan forgiveness" were excluded from both numerator and
denominator.
168. See Table 14, supra.
169. See America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 44.
170. Telephone Interview with Samuel Flanigan, Deputy Director of Data Research,
U.S. News & World Report (June 27, 2006).
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UGPAs for ranking purposes, not for reasons having anything to do with
legal education. Lowering the weight given scholarships minimizes the
impact of such games.
A counter-argument is that at least some expenditures in this category
do affect student opportunities in significant ways. My school, for exam-
ple, has a grant program that funds students in summer public interest
jobs. As a result, many students who otherwise could not afford to do so
receive supervised public interest legal experience. Similarly, my school
offers public interest loan forgiveness for students who go into lower-
paying public interest jobs upon graduation. While this program is not
"educational" in the curricular sense, it is certainly as educational as ex-
penditures incurred to place graduates in big firms-to which U.S. News
accords its higher 9.75% weight. The ABA treats these as "direct" ex-
penditures; U.S. News does not.
(b) Do higher reported expenditures significantly improve program
quality?
At the beginning of my expenditure discussion, I posed two questions.
The first was whether higher reported figures actually reflected additional
dollars spent on the J.D. programs U.S. News was ranking. Because the
data in question was of such poor quality, I suggested, the answer was, at
best, "in many situations, it is very hard to tell." I turn now to the second
question: whether additional dollars spent actually improve the quality of
those programs in meaningful ways.
The assumption, of course, is that more money means a commensu-
rately better program. Three preliminary observations about this as-
sumption may be useful. First, extensive studies of K-12 public schools
have failed to establish any systematic relationship between per-student
expenditures and student achievement. 171 There is no obvious reason to
believe that a stronger relationship exists in the context of legal educa-
tion. Second, U.S. News-ranked schools all meet the ABA's relatively
high standards for accreditation, which effectively require expenditures
per student more than twice those of non-ABA-accredited law schools. 172
The question, therefore, is not whether ranked schools are spending
enough, as it sometimes is in the context of public elementary or secon-
dary schools; the question is rather whether more is always better-in-
171. See generally W. Lance Conn, Funding Fundamentals: The Cost/Quality Debate in
School Finance Reform, 94 ED. L. REP. 9 (1994); Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance
"Reform" May Not Be Good Policy, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 423 (1991).
172. American Bar Association, supra note 56, at Table F-6. The average 2004-2005
direct expenditures per FTE student for all ABA-approved law schools were $25,449. It
can be inferred that average total expenditures per FTE were therefore about $29,874. See
also id. at Table F-15 (average direct expenditures = $20,107,927; average total expendi-
tures = $23,603,114). By contrast, a sample of four California-accredited law schools (Cal
Northern School of Law, San Francisco Law School, Empire College School of Law, and
Glendale University College of Law) charge an average full-time tuition rate for
2006-2007 of $12,395. It is unlikely that these schools spend substantially more per student
than they receive in tuition. This suggests that ABA-accredited schools spend, on average,
more than twice as much per student as California-accredited schools.
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deed, proportionately better. Third, a number of law schools, including
many with unexceptional expenditure-per-student numbers, regularly run
operating surpluses. 173 In other words, they do not spend all that they
take in, saving instead for the future. Presumably, they believe their
levels of current expenditure to be adequate.
I would like to begin by framing this second question more concretely.
Recall that largely because of the expenditure variables, Yale outranked
Harvard by nine overall score points, Stanford moved past Harvard,
NYU moved past Chicago, and Pennsylvania moved past UC Berkeley.
The concrete question, therefore, is whether tangible educational oppor-
tunities are available at Yale and Stanford but not at Harvard, at NYU
but not at Chicago, and at Pennsylvania but not at UC Berkeley, that
might justify these scorings. If real educational opportunities are availa-
ble at the schools with higher reported expenditures but not at those with
lower, and if those opportunities are sufficiently important, then perhaps
U.S. News's use of its expenditure variables is valid. If not, then use of
those variables is harder to justify.
At least four possibilities suggest themselves. First, it is possible that
schools with higher "educational" expenditures per student have lower
student/faculty ratios, and that this in turn justifies higher scores. A sim-
ple response is that higher "educational" expenditures per student do not
necessarily translate into lower student/faculty ratios: Chicago, for exam-
ple, has a lower student/faculty ratio than NYU, even though it report-
edly spends less per student. In any event, if what one is really interested
in is student/faculty ratios, one should focus instead on student/faculty
ratios, not on expenditures per student. This issue of student/faculty ra-
tios is explored separately below.
An important variation of this first possibility, however, is that higher
"educational" expenditures per student signal that a school sponsors
more in-house clinics. The McCrate Report, 174 issued in 1992, evidenced
a belief on the part of many that hands-on, practical legal training should
become an important part of the American law school experience. Law
schools now use both externship programs and in-house clinics to provide
such training. In-house clinics, however, are much more expensive, in
part because they require more faculty and low student/faculty ratios. 175
Perhaps the use of expenditure-per-student data in rankings can be justi-
173. See id. at Table F-19; American Bar Association, Take-offs from the 2004-05 An-
nual ABA Law School Questionnaire, at Table F-19; American Bar Association, Take-offs
from the 2003-04 Annual ABA Law School Questionnaire, at Table F-19.
174. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION & ADMISSIONS TO
THE BAR, Legal Education and Professional Development: An Educational Continuum,
Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap (1992),
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/publications/onlinepubs/maccrate.html.
175. See William R. Trail & William D. Underwood, The Decline of Professional Legal
Training and a Proposal for its Revitalization in Professional Law Schools, 48 BAYLOR L.
REV. 201, 240 (1996) ("Effective skills training tends to be more expensive than other
aspects of legal education because of the lower faculty-student ratios generally required to
provide necessary supervision and feedback.").
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fied on the ground that they reflect superior practical legal training.
Three questions arise in this regard: (1) Are clinics superior to extern-
ships? (2) How are clinics and externships credited for ranking purposes?
And finally, (3) given the answers to questions (1) and (2), are expendi-
tures an appropriate measure of the quality of a school's clinical
education?
A thorough evaluation of the relative merits of externships and in-
house clinics is beyond the scope of this article; a brief summary, how-
ever, may be useful. 17 6 Externships can offer practical training in a much
wider variety of contexts than in-house clinics As a result, externs can
often get practical training more directly related to their personal career
goals. On the other hand, students are often given greater responsibility
for individual client matters in in-house clinics. Moreover, clinics can be
offered in subject areas in which externships may not be locally available;
this is particularly important for law schools not located in major metro-
politan areas. J.P. Ogilvy states:
Externships share many of the teaching goals of in-house, live-client
clinics. Some high credit-hour, closely supervised externships closely
resemble in-house, live-client clinics. In most externship programs,
however, students are given far less responsibility for client represen-
tation than is available through an in-house clinic. On the other
hand, externships may provide students with unparalleled opportuni-
ties to define and pursue learning goals, to explore career interests in
a variety of legal jobs, and to build a professional network.177
Colorable arguments can be made that the average in-house clinic is su-
perior to the average externship in important regards. Nevertheless, a
well-designed externship program can provide many of the same educa-
tional benefits and in some contexts can do so more effectively. As
Deborah Maranville notes, "[a]n uneasy truce persists ... between propo-
nents of 'in-house' clinics and externships programs.' 178
The U.S. News rankings do not reflect any such truce. U.S. News gives
full rankings credit for clinics, no credit whatever for externship pro-
grams. At least two U.S. News's input factors capture the benefits of clin-
ics operated within the university's corporate shell: "expenditures per
student for instruction, library, and supporting services" and "student/
faculty ratio." 179 Neither captures any of the benefits of externships. The
costs of externship training are borne by the organization with which a
student is placed; in exchange, that organization receives the student's
services. As a result, those costs are not included in the law school's
176. See generally Deborah Maranville, Passion, Context, and Lawyering Skills: Choos-
ing Among Simulated and Real Clinical Experiences, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 123 (2000); J.P.
Ogilvy, Introduction to the Symposium on Developments in Legal Externship Pedagogy, 5
CLINICAL L. REV. 337 (1999); Robert F. Seibel & Linda H. Morton, Field Placement Pro-
grams: Practices, Problems and Possibilities, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 413 (1996).
177. J.P. Ogilvy, Guidelines with Commentary for the Evaluation of Legal Externship
Programs, 38 GONz. L. REV. 155, 160 (2003).
178. Maranville, supra note 176, at 124.
179. See America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 45.
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budget and are not credited to the law school for ranking purposes. Simi-
larly, the extern's on-site supervisor is not counted in computing the
school's student/faculty ratio, even on a fractional basis. Some two hun-
dred thirty lawyers, each an expert in a specialized field, supervise and
train my school's externs each year, typically on a one-on-one basis. Al-
though these lawyers provide important practical legal training, they are
completely ignored for ranking purposes. In effect, U.S. News takes an
extreme position in the ongoing pedagogic debate: clinics valuable, ex-
ternships worthless.
Given the foregoing, can the inclusion of expenditures per student be
justified, in part, on the ground that they measure the quality of a school's
clinical education? I think not. One would need significantly more evi-
dence, for example, to conclude that Yale should be awarded 7.5 more
overall score points than Harvard because of the supposed superiority of
the practical legal training it offers. The numbers are simply too indirect
to permit any such inference.
A second possibility is that schools with higher "educational" expendi-
tures per student pay their faculty members higher average salaries.
Higher-paid faculty members, the argument goes, are on average "bet-
ter." Setting aside for a moment the question of how such faculty mem-
bers are "better," I find this argument persuasive when comparing mid-
ranked with top-ranked schools. Top-ranked schools tend to acquire a
much larger portion of their faculties through lateral hiring. Lateral hir-
ing often involves significant pay hikes for the professors involved.
Schools that routinely engage in lateral hiring must presumably adjust
their pay scales for home-grown faculty members so as to avoid major
disparities between their home-grown and laterally-hired faculties. Al-
though comprehensive law school salary data is not available, it seems
likely that higher-ranked schools do tend to pay their faculty members
significantly higher salaries, on average, than lower-ranked schools. 180
There are at least two problems with justifying use of "educational"
expenditures per student figures in law school rankings on this ground.
First, most readers do not use U.S. News merely to determine whether a
school is in the bottom, middle, or top of the pack; most use it to compare
closely ranked schools-for example, Yale versus Harvard, or NYU ver-
sus Chicago. As noted in the introduction to this topic, in such close com-
parisons expenditure per student figures have an enormous impact. Do
they have comparable validity? Can one really suppose that NYU pays
its professors 75% more, on average, than Chicago, as their relative "edu-
cational" expenditures per student might be read to imply? This seems
utterly improbable.
180. Compare Michigan Daily, Average University of Michigan Professorial Salaries,
http://apps.michigandaily.com/salary/200607.xls (providing University of Michigan em-
ployee salaries), with Society of American Law Teachers, 2005-2006 SALT Salary Survey 1




A second problem has to do with what is meant by asserting that
higher-paid faculty members are, on average, "better." Top-ranked
schools hire laterally for scholarship, not for teaching. The inference
must therefore be that higher "educational" expenditures per student sig-
nal faculties with higher scholarly reputations. Again, it is not clear that
the signal is valid; one would be hard-pressed to justify any such infer-
ence, for example, in comparing NYU with Chicago. Even assuming va-
lidity, however, the question remains whether prospective students or
employers should care. In physics or chemistry, cutting-edge scholarship
matters. In law, by contrast, cutting-edge legal scholarship often has no
relevance whatever to actual practice. Indeed, some professors at top-
ranked schools have been accused of not teaching law at all. In any
event, academic reputation is already captured by U.S. News's peer as-
sessment input variable.
A third and very real possibility is that many additional "educational"
dollars per student tend to be spent on functions and projects not at the
core of legal education-centers, institutes, conferences, fundraising,
alumni relations, public relations, and the like. Apart from student/
faculty ratios, clinical offerings, and faculty salaries, I have been unable to
identify any significant differences in the real educational inputs available
at the schools named in the concrete question posed at the beginning of
this discussion. If important differences exist, one would expect the
higher-spending schools to advertise them. They do not.181
It is also easy to understand why deans might not focus additional dol-
lars on improving educational performance. Once a not-for-profit law
181. Yale's website characterizes its core advantages in the following terms: "[O]ur
unmatched faculty-student ratio allows us to offer a vast array of courses, an average class
size of under 25 students, and countless opportunities for independent research, writing,
and student-organized discussion groups. With almost 200 courses taught by more than 60
full-time faculty and dozens of visiting faculty, lecturers, and adjunct professors, the
choices for the study of law at Yale Law School are only as limited as your imagination."
Yale Law School, Academics, http://www.law.yale.edu/academics/academics.htm (last vis-
ited Dec. 20, 2006).
Stanford's website states: "Our programs-intensive curriculum, hands-on legal clinics,
high-profile academic centers-cultivate professional skills and values, inspire new ideas,
and engage leaders in developing solutions. And our resources-from cutting-edge facili-
ties to the diverse advantages of Stanford University-make the Stanford Law campus an
ideal environment for exploring and mastering the law." Stanford Law School, The
School, http://www.law.stanford.edu/school/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
NYU's website advertises, first and foremost: "our truly outstanding faculty-a group
that values the chance to teach, in addition to producing cutting-edge scholarship that is
often directly tied to the big issues of the day-and . . . an extraordinary peer group."
Subsidiarily, it advertises clinical opportunities: "Please be sure to take a look at our
hands-on offerings, including the Root Tilden Kern Program, the Furman Academic Pro-
gram, the An Bryce Scholarship Program and the Institute for International Law and Jus-
tice." NYU School of Law, Welcome from Dean Richard Revesz, http://www.law.nyu.edu/
prospective/welcome.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
Pennsylvania advertises (1) "an outstanding group of leading scholars in every major
area of law," (2) "a cross-disciplinary program that is unrivaled among the leading law
schools," and (3) the fact that it ranks "third in a national survey in student satisfaction."
University of Pennsylvania Law School, About Penn Law, http://www.law.upenn.edu/
about/index.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
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school has met the benchmarks necessary for accreditation, it faces al-
most no further pressure to provide the best possible service at the lowest
possible cost. Unlike a for-profit business, if additional dollars become
available, it will likely spend them. But because the quality of legal edu-
cation is almost impossible to measure directly, such further expenditures
will not necessarily be used to improve an educational program that is has
already been declared adequate. As a result, at least in the non-profit
educational world, there is no obvious reason to expect that more dollars
will necessarily translate into higher educational quality. It may simply
be that deans with tighter budgets run more efficient ships.
A fourth possibility, of course, is that differences in reported amounts,
at least within tiers, are primarily evidence of differences in accounting or
reporting conventions.
The discussion to this point can be viewed, in significant part, as ad-
dressing a basic technical question in law school economics: are there
diminishing marginal returns to expenditures on legal education? The
U.S. News methodology assumes there are not. Most economists, I sus-
pect, would find this assumption deeply problematic. Two further techni-
cal problems compound the difficulty of assessing whether higher
reported expenditures improve program quality. The first is the problem
of economies of scale. The U.S. News methodology assumes that it costs
twice as much to educate an incoming class of two hundred as it does to
educate one of one hundred, and four times as much to educate a class of
four hundred-in other words, that legal education involves no econo-
mies of scale. Although I am unaware of any studies of the issue, U.S.
News's assumption seems inherently implausible. Every law school must
maintain much of the same basic infrastructure regardless of its size: a
computerized recordkeeping system, a library with one copy of each of
the standard reference series and texts, a web and hard-copy publication
presence, an employer-relations function, and so on. Similarly, although
the size of the first-year faculty is typically proportional to the size of the
first-year class, the number of upper division specialists commonly is not.
Every well-rounded law faculty arguably needs at least one expert in anti-
trust law, one in labor law, one in environmental law, one in comparative
law, and so on; rarely is there sufficient demand, however, even at large
law schools, to force the hiring of more than one. Intuitively, therefore,
one would expect significant economies of scale in legal education. But if
this is so, then U.S. News's use of expenditure-per-student numbers sys-
tematically biases its rankings against larger law schools.
The second technical problem is the problem of adjustments for "cost
of living." The proper adjustment, of course, would not be for "cost of
living" at all; it would be for "cost of legal education." A school in a
region with a lower "cost of legal education" should be able to offer the
same real inputs while spending less money. Unfortunately, no such in-
dex exists; U.S. News therefore substitutes "cost of living" adjustments.
Because the Runzheimer COLAs are not publicly available, we do not
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know how big the U.S. News adjustments are. The ACCRA COLAs,
however, usefully illustrate some of the problems created by making this
substitution. According to ACCRA, the cost of living in Washington,
DC, is 43% higher than the cost of living in Durham, North Carolina.182
This seems intuitively plausible. But assuming this to be true, can one
properly then infer that Georgetown pays its law professors, on average,
43% more than similarly qualified professors at Duke? Does it mean
that Georgetown pays 43% more for books and 43% more for computer
and communications systems than Duke? The answer to both questions
is almost certainly "no."'1 83 But U.S. News's methodology assumes that
the answer is "yes." This assumption clearly affects its relative rankings
of the two schools.1 84
It is probably even the case that some law school costs are lower in
major metropolitan areas, where costs of living tend to be higher, than
they are elsewhere-in other words, that "cost of legal education" is
sometimes inversely related to "cost of living." Adjunct professors with
extraordinary qualifications can be retained in major legal centers for em-
barrassingly small sums;185 to replicate their expertise at a school not lo-
cated in a major legal center would often be prohibitively expensive.
Similarly, externship programs providing valuable practical legal training
in a wide variety of contexts are inexpensive to operate in major legal
centers; law schools not located in such centers may be forced to substi-
tute in-house clinics at a much higher cost.
In sum, the quality of U.S. News's expenditures-per-student data is
poor and evidence is scarce that each additional COLA-adjusted dollar
spent produces a commensurate increase in educational quality, particu-
larly in comparing schools within tiers. I conclude that the use of the two
expenditure variables in U.S. News's methodology probably adds signifi-
cantly more error than information to its ultimate rankings.
182. American Chamber of Commerce Resource Association, supra note 69.
183. One major cost of legal education that does probably vary, more or less, with con-
ventional cost-of-living is land. But, as already noted, land is not accounted for in any
consistent way in U.S. News's expenditure data.
184. Because of problems in the ABA Take-Off expenditure data, it is difficult to iso-
late the effect of the cost-of-living adjustment. If the expenditure variables are eliminated
from the computation entirely, Georgetown moves up from 14th to 12th; Duke remains in
l1th place. See America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 44.
185. My school's current tax adjunct professors, for example, include the Deputy Area
Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel of the IRS, the Deputy Controller (Taxation) for the
State of California, the National Director of Entertainment Tax Services at Ernst & Young,
a former Chief of the Tax Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles, a former
IRS Western Regional Professor-in-Residence, a former partner in charge of nationwide
tax training for the KPMG International Services Practice group, the former national Di-
rector of Insurance Tax Services at Price Waterhouse, a Fellow of the American College of
Tax Counsel, a Fellow of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel and Academi-
cian of the International Academy of Estate and Trust Law, a BNA Tax Management port-
folio author, five Chairs or former Chairs of Los Angeles area bar association Tax Sections,
and a former United States Supreme Court clerk. The cost of the expertise they collec-




Use of student/faculty ratios in a law school ranking system might, at
first blush, appear to be unproblematic. After all, in grade schools, stu-
dent/teacher ratios are viewed as critical to educational quality. A lower
student/teacher ratio almost always means smaller class sizes and more
teacher attention per pupil.
At law schools, however, the same does not hold true. Most obviously,
at many higher-ranked schools (or schools that aspire to reach a higher
rank), teaching is not necessarily perceived to be a professor's primary
function. Scholarship is. At such schools, professors generally teach
fewer hours per year. At the 10 highest-ranked law schools, for example,
the average annual teaching load is 7.94 hours; in U.S. News's third and
fourth tier, it is 11.13 hours-40% higher.186 As a result, the lower stu-
dent/faculty ratios associated with higher rank do not necessarily result in
smaller class sizes-they may merely free up faculty time to write. This is
great for faculty, but not particularly helpful for students or employers.
Nor do lower student/faculty ratios necessarily imply more faculty at-
tention to students outside of class. According to The Princeton Review's
student surveys, the ten law schools that rank highest in terms of "accessi-
ble and interesting" professors are, in order:
Student/faculty ratio
Washington & Lee 10.5
Boston University 12.1








Median ratio for all ranked schools 15.7
Thus, of the ten U.S. law schools that score highest on faculty-student
interaction, five fall in the lower half of all schools ranked by student/
faculty ratio. Student/faculty ratios appear to be poor predictors of
faculty accessibility.
I have already discussed two further reasons that student/faculty ratios
might mean less than might first appear. First is the fact that a low stu-
dent/faculty ratio often means merely that the law school in question
sponsors more in-house clinics. A school with multiple in-house clinics
186. Annual teaching loads for full-time law faculty at U.S. News-rated schools range
from 6.7 to 15.2 hours for schools on the semester system and from 8.3 to 16.7 hours for
schools on the quarter system. American Bar Association, supra note 56, at Table B-2.
According to the Take-Offs, "Annual Teaching Load is derived by dividing total contact
hours by the number of faculty FTE and then doubling the quotient for schools on the
semester basis and tripling the quotient for schools on the quarter basis." Id.
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may report a low student/faculty ratio even if class sizes in its substantive
curriculum remain large. As noted, in-house clinics are plusses. But U.S.
News's methodology is heavily biased in favor of in-house clinics and
against externship programs; its use of student/faculty ratios in ranking is
one of the principal sources of that bias. Second is the fact that a major-
ity of the student/faculty ratios reported to U.S. News are different from
those reported in the ABA Take-Offs. The quality of the numbers re-
ported to U.S. News, it can be inferred, is low.
Finally, in reading student/faculty ratios, it is important to keep in mind
that the ABA's formula for computing such ratios does not count all
faculty members equally. An unwary reader may therefore misinterpret
the results. ABA Interpretation 402-1 provides that in computing student/
faculty ratios, each full-time teacher on tenure track "or its equivalent"
shall be counted as one.187 ABA Interpretation 405-6 explains that "[a]
form of security of position reasonably similar to tenure includes . . .a
program of renewable long-term contracts .... For the purposes of this
Interpretation, 'long-term contract' means at least a five-year contract
that is presumptively renewable or other arrangement sufficient to ensure
academic freedom."'188 Typically, most of a law school's clinical faculty
will meet this requirement and be fully counted in the tally.
The ABA Standards then count the employment of "additional teach-
ing resources," but provide that each such additional instructor shall be
counted as the equivalent of less than one full-time tenure-track
teacher. 189 Each clinician and legal writing instructor not on tenure track
or its equivalent is counted as 70% of a faculty member; each adjunct
professor as 20% of a faculty member. 190 The Interpretation allows such
"additional teaching resources" to constitute up to 20% of the FTE
faculty for purposes of computing student/faculty ratios.191 Thus, a
school with forty tenured or tenure-track professors can count up to fifty
adjuncts in computing that ratio. For ABA purposes, such a school, with
ninety actual professors, is treated for student/faculty ratio and teaching
load purposes as having only 50 FTE faculty members (40 x 1 plus 50 x .2
= 50).
As noted, schools in major metropolitan areas are more likely to be
able to attract qualified adjuncts. Since adjuncts typically teach more
than 20% of a full load, 192 this means that student/faculty ratios and
ABA-reported average teaching loads at schools in major metropolitan
areas are likely to be overstated. Similarly, schools outside of major met-
187. ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools, Interpretation 402-1, http://www.
abanet.org/legaled/standards/chapter4.html (last visited May 20, 2007).
188. ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools, Interpretation 405-6, http://www.
abanet.org/legaled/standards/chapter4.html (last visited May 20, 2007).
189. ABA Standards, supra note 186.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. The mean average teaching load at U.S. News-ranked law schools is 10.41 hours.
American Bar Association, supra note 56, at Table B-2. A single three-hour course would
therefore constitute 29% of a full load at the average ranked school.
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ropolitan areas often have a harder time offering significant externship
programs and are sometimes therefore forced to sponsor more in-house
clinics. The resulting clinical faculty members lower both reported stu-
dent/faculty ratios and reported average teaching loads, without changing
in any way the nature of the school's substantive legal instruction.
6. Library
Volume and title counts reflect, although sometimes imperfectly, a law
school's past commitment to its library. A library's current acquisition
budget, by contrast, reflects the school's current commitment. U.S. News
combines volume and title counts in its library variable, which is then
given a weight of only 0.75%.193
My school's history makes me suspicious of volume and title counts
even as measures of past commitment. Some two decades ago, the
school's library director undertook a radical purge of the school's collec-
tion, cutting it approximately in half. Out went the free Department of
Agriculture manuals on pig farming and forty nine of the fifty copies of
Prosser on Torts. He then persuaded the dean to give him an acquisitions
budget that has since remained, on average, one of the top dozen in the
country. As already noted, the result is a collection that now surpasses
Stanford's in size. Because of the library's larger acquisitions budget, 194
it is probably also more current than Stanford's. Given the very low
weight accorded law libraries in U.S. News's methodology, however, two
paragraphs is probably about as much discussion as this final input varia-
ble merits.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I conclude that U.S. News's rankings
and overall scores should be taken with a serious grain of salt. The input
variables U.S. News has selected are facially plausible. Upon closer ex-
amination, however, many of them turn out to be of questionable valid-
ity, and important parts of the data appear to be of poor quality. The
ultimate rankings are then computed using procedures that are extremely
sensitive to small changes in data or method-unreliable, in the language
of statistics.
The resulting rankings may be useful in separating top from middle
from bottom. That is not, however, how readers typically use them.
Even apparently large ranking differences or changes may have no un-
derlying meaning. Between 2007 and 2008, for example, Pepperdine rose
by twenty one ranks, while San Diego fell by twenty. 195 I have not been
able to identify any material changes at either school that would justify
193. See America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 45.
194. According to the 2005 ABA Take-Offs, Law Library Comprehensive Statistical
Table, variable 50a, Loyola LA's library acquisition budget was 30% larger than Stan-
ford's. American Bar Association, supra note 56, at Law Library Comprehensive Statisti-
cal Table.
195. Compare America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 45, with USNews.com,
America's Best Graduate Schools 2008: Top Law Schools, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/
edu/grad/rankings/law/brief/lawrank brief.php (last visited May 29, 2007).
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any material change in their ranks. There may well be differences be-
tween a law school ranked 30th and one ranked 60th, but those differ-
ences are probably not accurately or reliably captured by U.S. News's
methodology. Given the defects of that methodology, it is quite possible
that a law school ranked 30th by U.S. News should actually be ranked
60th, and vice versa. Caveat emptor.
PART III. MANAGING YOUR SCHOOL'S RANKINGS
Law school administrators sometimes assume that LSATs have an ef-
fect on the U.S. News rankings greater than the 12.5% weight they are
ostensibly assigned.196 How this "fact" came to pervade the literature is
obscure, although some blame must probably be assigned to two widely-
quoted sentences in the 1998 Klein-Hamilton study:
[A]bout 90% of the overall differences in ranks among schools can
be explained solely by the median LSAT score of their entering clas-
ses and essentially all of the differences can be explained by the com-
bination of LSAT and Academic reputation ratings. Consequently,
all of the other 10 factors US News measures .. have virtually no
effect on the overall ranks ... 197
Drs. Klein and Hamilton should have written more carefully. Many read
the quoted sentences as statements about causation. They are not. They
are statements about correlation. As already noted, at the top end differ-
ences in LSATs have almost no causal effect on either overall scores or
ranks.
The weights are the weights are the weights. Except as noted in Part I,
I have no reason to believe that U.S. News departs from its publicly dis-
closed methodology in any regard. I have replicated that methodology, at
least approximately, and my replication produces the results that U.S.
News says it should produce-again, at least approximately. If a law
school focuses exclusively on LSATs and fails to manage its UGPAs or
nine-month employment figures, it will likely fall in the rankings-proba-
bly by a significant amount.
I do not propose to discuss specific techniques for managing this varia-
ble or that. Others have already done so;198 further techniques will un-
doubtedly occur to careful readers of Parts I and II above. What I do
196. See, e.g., William D. Henderson & Andrew P. Morriss, Student Quality as Mea-
sured by LSAT Scores: Migration Patterns in the U.S. News Rankings Era, 81 IND. L. J. 163,
165 (2006) ("Although U.S. News relies upon a methodology that encompasses a variety of
substantive factors.... student [LSAT] scores have assumed... an importance far greater
than their current, direct 12.5% weighting."); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Destruction of the
Holistic Approach to Admissions: The Pernicious Effects of Rankings, 81 IND. L. J. 309,
312 (2006) ("Given the near-perfect correlation between the median LSAT score and the
school's ranking, a school may raise its median LSAT score and presumably ranking by
rejecting students with lower LSAT scores.").
197. See Klein & Hamilton, supra note 3.
198. See, e.g., Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Interplay Between Law School Rankings, Repu-




offer instead are two sets of possibly useful insights based on my numeri-
cal analysis.
The first is a table of leading and lagging input variables, set forth in
Appendix D. For the most part, schools' input variable values are
roughly the same number of standard deviations away from the means of
those input variables as their overall scores are from the mean overall
score. Sometimes, however, a school does especially well or poorly with
respect to a particular input variable. Appendix D identifies, for each
school, the variables with respect to which that school does better or
worse (in terms of standard deviations away from the mean) than the
school's overall score. Amounts are given in overall score points. In
other words, each entry in the table indicates the approximate amount by
which a particular variable pulls the school's overall score up or down.
It may be useful to walk through one school's results to assist the
reader in interpreting results for other schools. With apologies, I will use
the school that heads the list alphabetically-Akron. As is set forth in
Appendix D, Akron's 2007 leading and lagging input variables were as
follows:
Peer assessment score -1.4




Employment at graduation 0.4
Employment at 9 months 1.1
Bar pass 0.1
"Educational" expenses per student 0.0




What these figures indicate is that Akron's "educational" expenses per
student and library collection are exactly what one would expect for a
school with Akron's overall score. Its two reputational scores pull it
down by a total of four overall score points. Its remaining variables pull
it back up by the same four overall score points. (Indeed, the sum of all
leading and lagging indicators for any given school should always equal
zero.).
Based on its leading and lagging indicators, Akron appears to be the
classic overachieving, underappreciated law school-with better students
than its U.S. News score would indicate, a better student/faculty ratio, and
a better placement record. Looking solely at these numbers, one might
hypothesize that Akron's faculty is comparatively less productive,
thereby perhaps justifying the school's lower reputational scores. A re-
view of Akron's SSRN download statistics, however, suggests that in
terms of posted scholarship the school's faculty significantly outperforms
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its U.S. News ranking.' 99 The bottom line seems to be that Akron is pul-
led down primarily by the fact that no one can keep the relative qualifica-
tions of one hundred eighty law faculties straight when it comes time to
fill out the U.S. News questionnaire.
Leading and lagging indicators can also be used to measure how much
influence each variable has on overall scores. As a computational matter,
of course, the weights are the weights. But a variable that is closely cor-
related with the remaining eleven could actually be dropped from the
calculation with relatively little effect on ultimate rankings. The influence
a particular variable has on overall scores therefore depends not merely
on its weight, but also on the extent to which that variable is not corre-
lated with the other eleven-in lay terms, the extent to which the variable
in question is out of step with other indicators used by U.S. News. The
next table gives such a measure. The number given for each variable rep-
resents the average of the absolute values of the amounts (in overall
score points) by which that variable leads or lags overall score for each of
the one hundred eighty ranked schools.
Peer assessment score 1.29




Employment at graduation .35
Employment at 9 months 1.42200
Bar pass .21
"Educational" expenses per student 1.11
Other expenses per student .27
Student/faculty ratio .45
Library .09
The influence of peer assessment scores should not be surprising, given
the fact that this first variable is weighted more heavily (25%) than any
other. What jumps out from the table, however, is the extraordinary in-
fluence of nine-month employment figures and "educational" expenses
per student. Law schools gain or lose more overall score points-an av-
erage of 1.42 such points-by reason of their nine-month employment
numbers than by reason of any other variable. Similarly, they gain or lose
an average of 1.11 overall score points by reason of "educational" ex-
penses per student, despite the fact that that variable is only the sixth
most heavily weighted out of twelve. Why? Because these two variables
199. The author estimates that Akron ranks 130th by overall score using U.S. News's
methodology. By contrast, as of May 1, 2007, it ranked 108th by all-time SSRN downloads
and 114th by recent SSRN downloads (that is, downloads within the past twelve months).
See Social Science Research Network, SSRN Top U.S. Law Schools, http://hq.ssrn.com/
Rankings/Ranking-display.cfm?TMYglD=2&TRNglD=13 (last visited May 22, 2007).
200. This number is corrected for an apparent clerical error that by my calculation cost




are significantly out-of-step with U.S. News's other indicators of law
school quality. This fact both reinforces this article's conclusion that their
use may be inappropriate and suggests that an administrator seeking to
manage her school's ranking might well begin with them.
A second set of numbers administrators may find useful is a table of
what I call "overall score equivalents," given immediately below. Each
overall score equivalent indicates how much a school would have to move
with respect to a given input variable to move the school's overall score
by just one point-assuming no other changes at that or any other school.
In effect, the table suggests how sensitive a law school's overall score is to
changes in particular variables. Obviously, less movement should be re-
quired with respect to higher-weighted variables, more with respect to
lower-weighted variables to effect the same one-point movement of the
school's overall score. But because all variables are normalized before
being combined, the sensitivity of overall score to a given variable also
depends on the distribution of the other one hundred seventy nine
schools' data with respect that variable.
Overall Score Equivalents
Peer assessment score 0.179
Lawyer/judge assessment score 0.258
Median LSAT percentile equivalents 6.8 percentile points
Median undergraduate GPAs 0.0965 on a 4.0 scale
Acceptance rate 20 percentage points
Employment rate at graduation 22 percentage points
Employment rate at nine months 3.1 percentage points
Bar passage ratio 0.417
"Educational" expenditures per student $2,949
Other expenditures per student $14,995
Student/faculty ratio 5.54 students/faculty
Library volumes and titles 2,237,366
I will use my own school's numbers in explaining how to read and use
this table. Beginning at the top, the table tells us that Loyola Los Ange-
les could boost its overall score by one point (and therefore move up five
ranks) simply by moving its academic reputation number up by 0.179
(from 2.5 to 2.7). It could accomplish the same result by moving its prac-
titioner reputation number up by .258 (from 2.9 to 3.2) or by improving
its median LSAT the equivalent of 6.8 percentile points (more on this
below and in Appendix E) or its median UGPA by 0.0965 (from 3.28 to
3.38). Achieving the same one-point jump by changing its acceptance
rate would be almost impossible. A school like Loyola Los Angeles,
which currently accepts 23.4% of its applicants, would have to reduce that
figure by twenty percentage points-to 3.4%-to move a single overall
score point. Similarly, it would take a difficult twenty-two percentage
point improvement in employment rates at graduation (from 73.7% to
95.7%) to effect the same one-point improvement. By contrast, it would
take only a 3.1 percentage point improvement in employment rates nine
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months out to move the same overall score point. Because the school is
already at 97.6%, however, to do so would require that it boost its nine-
month employment rate to 100.7%-mathematically impossible.
Interpreting the bar passage ratio "overall score equivalent" is compli-
cated because of the way bar passage ratios are computed. The table tells
us that a school must boost its bar passage ratio by 0.417 to move its U.S.
News overall score by a single point. To make practical use of this figure,
one must first compute a school's current bar passage ratio. In Loyola
Los Angeles's case, the ratio is 1.074 (65.5% school pass rate divided by
the 61% average California pass rate). Add 0.417 to produce, in Loyola
Los Angeles's case, 1.491. Then multiply the result by the average state
pass rate; for Loyola Los Angeles, multiply the result by 61% (Califor-
nia's average pass rate) to produce 91%. Conclusion: Loyola Los Ange-
les would have to move its California bar pass rate from 65.5% to 91% to
move its overall score up by a single point. I have done the relevant
computations for all U.S. News-ranked schools; the results are given in
Appendix E.
Hopefully, the expenditure-per-student overall score equivalents are
more self-explanatory. To move up one overall score point, Loyola Los
Angeles would need to raise its COLA-adjusted "educational" expendi-
tures per student by $2,949 or its COLA-adjusted other expenditures per
student by $14,995. Alternatively, it could reclassify $3,671 of COLA-
adjusted "indirect" expenditures per student as "direct" without changing
its total expenditures at all. One problem, of course, is that the relevant
Runzheimer COLAs are not publicly available, so I cannot convert the
foregoing numbers into actual dollar amounts. Finally, Loyola Los Ange-
les could achieve the same one-overall-score point upward movement by
lowering its student/faculty ratio by 5.54, from 16.0 to 10.46.201 This
would require increasing its full-time-equivalent faculty by forty, from
75.6 to 115.6. Or it could increase the total title/volume count of its li-
brary by 2,237,366-from 827,863 to 3,065,229-that is, by more than
tripling its library's size to surpass Harvard's. Neither of these latter two
approaches to rank management is likely to be cost-effective.
All but two entries in the table given above can be applied with relative
ease to any given law school's numbers. Two, however, require computa-
tions of some complexity to be of practical use: median LSATs and bar
pass rates. I have therefore performed the relevant calculations; the re-
sults for all U.S. News-ranked schools appear in Appendix E. Again, let
me use my own school in explaining how to use the results published in
that Appendix. The first two columns indicate how far the school's me-
dian LSAT would have to move in order to move the school's overall
score one point up or one point down; the last two columns give the same
201. The numbers given are the ABA numbers, not the U.S. News numbers. As has
been noted, the U.S. News student/faculty ratio numbers are generally different from those




information with regard to bar passage. The Appendix therefore tells us
that if Loyola Los Angeles's median LSAT were to move up to 164 and
nothing else were to change, its overall score would move up one point;
conversely, if its median LSAT were to drop to 158, its overall score
would move down one point. Similarly, if its California bar pass rate
were to move up to 91%, its overall score would move up one point; and
if that rate were to drop to 40%, its overall score would drop one point.
Two warnings are in order. First, the overall score equivalents given
above depend on the means and standard deviations of all the input data
sets. They will therefore change somewhat from year to year. Unless
U.S. News's methodology changes or significant changes occur in the data
itself, however, these changes should not be large. Second, the numbers
given are average numbers. For example, the table tells one that a one-
point shift in a school's overall score should require on average a 0.179
change in a school's peer assessment score. For some schools the re-
quired change will be greater, for some less. Obviously, the closer a
school already is to transitioning to the next overall score before the
change, the smaller the change required to effect that transition.
PART IV. IMPROVING THE U.S. NEWS RANKING SYSTEM
This final Part IV is addressed to several audiences. The first is U.S.
News itself; I would be delighted if U.S. News were to find any of my
suggestions helpful. Second is an audience made up of potential data
sources, most importantly the ABA's Section of Legal Education and Ad-
missions to the Bar. As a practical matter, U.S. News must base its rank-
ings on information that is relatively easy to collect. The ABA's decisions
as to what information to force law schools to compile, therefore, have a
profound impact on U.S. News's methodology. But the ABA is not the
only potentially relevant player in this regard. One of the recommenda-
tions given below, for example, is addressed to the National Board of Bar
Examiners, which administers the Multistate Bar Examination. Finally,
this Part IV is addressed to scholars interested in the objective assessment
of legal education.
This Article does not purport to offer a systematic critique of U.S.
News's methodology. Most importantly, it does not generally address the
issue of weights other than to point out that the rankings are useful only
to the extent that reader values the same things the U.S. News methodol-
ogy implicitly values, and gives them the same weight. This Part IV,
therefore, merely identifies possible improvements to U.S. News's meth-
odology based on the analyses I have actually undertaken. Other im-
provements undoubtedly are possible.
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A. IMPROVING THE INPUT VARIABLES
1. The reputational surveys
Unlike some, I am of the view that U.S. News's reputational surveys
provide valuable if flawed information about law schools and that U.S.
News performs a useful service in conducting them. In the real world,
reputations matter, even if they are not "objective." I would, however,
suggest several changes in the way the surveys are conducted.
First, respondents should be permitted to return fractional answers-
that is, a 4.2 or 4.7 rather than merely a 4 or 5. To assess almost two
hundred law schools on a five interval scale is unrealistically crude. Does
UC Berkeley deserve a "4" or a "5"? Probably neither. Were U.S. News
to make this change, the reputational survey information in its annual
publication would become correspondingly more reliable. Since U.S.
News already reports survey results to one decimal place, the change
would also make its published numbers more consistent with the raw data
it purports to be summarizing.
Second, U.S. News should reframe the questions posed to maximize the
utility of the responses. Academic respondents should be asked to rate
each school's scholarly reputation. This would ask academic respondents
a question as to which they might actually be able to provide an informed
answer. It would also add to the information U.S. News provides its read-
ers; currently, no input variable unambiguously measures scholarship.
Judge and lawyer respondents, by contrast, should be asked to rate the
quality of each school's graduates. Again, this is a question as to which
judges and lawyers might actually be able to provide an informed answer;
the responses could be of great value to readers. Both changes would
reduce the role of name recognition and increase the overall validity of
the rankings.
Third, U.S. News should discard the 10% highest and 10% lowest re-
sponses with respect to each school before averaging the remainder.
Some believe that academic respondents in particular complete U.S.
News's reputational survey strategically rather than honestly. Discarding
the high and low extremes would reduce the effect of strategic responses,
presumably therefore reducing the amount of such gaming, and increas-
ing the validity of the resulting scores.
2. Student body quality
As discussed in Part II above, U.S. News's UGPA and acceptance rate
variables appear to add at least as much error as information to its rank-
ings. Acceptance rates, which are highly manipulable and vary widely for
reasons having nothing to do with the quality of a school's student body,
should be omitted as an input factor. I am ambivalent, however, about
UGPAs. On the one hand, UGPAs from different undergraduate institu-
tions, and different majors are not reliably comparable; the inclusion of
UGPAs as an input factor therefore adds significant random error to the
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rankings. On the other, omitting both UGPAs and acceptance rates from
U.S. News's computation would leave LSATs as the sole measure of stu-
dent quality; this, in turn, would place pressure on schools to make admis-
sions decisions based solely on LSATs-not a desirable result. One
possible compromise might be to retain UGPAs in the formula but weight
them less heavily.
I also urge the ABA to make two changes in the LSAT and UGPA
statistics it requires law schools to compile. First, all such statistics should
include transfer students, not merely first year students.20 2 A widespread
practice has recently developed to game these numbers: the school
reduces the size of its entering class so as to be able to report higher
numbers; it then accepts an offsetting number of transfer students (whose
LSATs and UGPAs are never reported) to avoid revenue losses. This
practice is highly disruptive to both students and schools. There may be
good reasons for law schools to accept transfer students. But an ABA
reporting rule that incentivizes the practice, leading schools to accept
more transfers than they would in the absence of such a rule, is pedagogi-
cally unsound. In addition, I urge the ABA to require law schools to
compile 50th and 100th LSAT statistics. Such statistics would be of great
benefit to legal employers. They would also help offset the bias in favor
of smaller schools that the ABA's data collection effort currently exhibits.
Regardless whether any of the foregoing recommendations are ac-
cepted, however, one change should clearly be made: median LSATs
should not be converted to percentile equivalents before being combined
with the remaining variables. U.S. News's current practice in this regard
is indefensible and seriously compromises the credibility of its rankings.
3. Placement success
Both of U.S. News's employment variables are problematic (employ-
ment rates at graduation and employment rates nine-months after gradu-
ation). Neither carries much useful information. Both are highly
manipulable and vary widely for reasons having nothing to do with the
quality of the school. I would drop them. Bar passage rates, by contrast,
are important and relatively objective measures of educational output.
Unfortunately, bar passage rates vary significantly from state to state.
This fact undermines the utility of bar passage statistics in making na-
tional comparisons. The computational manipulations U.S. News under-
takes to make passage rates nationally comparable are not ultimately
successful, particularly for schools with pass rates close to 100%. I sug-
gest two possible changes.
The first would be to change the way the bar passage input variable





BPIVschoI = (School's rate)/(State average rate)20 3
This formula measures the distance of a particular school's bar passage
rate above or below the relevant state average. Unfortunately, as dis-
cussed in Part II, it also produces different state-to-state ceiling effects
that distort the rankings of schools with high pass rates. An alternative
would be to measure how far a school's bar passage rate is from 100%
relative to how far the state's average bar passage rate is from 100%. In
other words:
BPIVsch.ol = (100% - School's rate)/(100% - State average rate)
This would capture much of what U.S. News's current formula attempts
to capture while avoiding the state-to-state ceiling disparity problem. The
resulting data set would need to be inverted before being combined with
other inputs. More mathematically sophisticated manipulations would be
required to eliminate ceiling effects altogether. 204
A more informative change would require that the National Board of
Bar Examiners agree to compile and release average scores and other
performance statistics, by law school, of graduates sitting for the Multis-
tate Bar Exam (MBE).20 5 The MBE is a nationally uniform measure of
legal educational success; no computational manipulation would be re-
quired to make such school averages nationally comparable. In addition,
average scores would provide more information about educational suc-
cess than mere pass rates. Finally, the performance of all of a law
school's graduates, not merely those sitting for the bar in a single state,
would then be counted in measuring the school's performance.
4. Expenditures per student
Because of the extensive and irremediable problems with U.S. News's
expenditure-per-student variables detailed in Part II above, I see no way
of reforming those variables to make them reliable and valid indicators of
law school quality. The interschool accounting comparability problems
are profound. There is no audit process. Because the variables them-
selves are not published, there is not even a public shaming incentive for
schools to be honest in their reporting. U.S. News's necessary assumption
that there are no diminishing marginal returns in legal education is un-
likely to be even approximately true. Its assumption that there are no
economies of scale is equally problematic. Its substitution of "cost of liv-
ing" as a proxy for "cost of legal education" is highly questionable. Al-
though dollars may well make a difference, the data U.S. News actually
uses and the manipulations it performs before using these data make
these two variables profoundly and uncorrectably unreliable and invalid.
203. Id.
204. E.g., BPIVschoo] = log(100%-School's rate)/log(100%-State average rate).
205. The 2008 U.S. News issue reports that this year U.S. News obtained its bar passage
statistics from the National Board of Bar Examiners. USNews.com, America's Best Gradu-
ate Schools 2008: Law Methodology, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/grad/rankings/
about/08law.methbrief.php (last visited May 22, 2007).
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I would omit them, and would substantially discount any rankings that
include them.
5. Student/faculty ratios
The first and most obvious suggestion I would make with regard to
student/faculty ratios is that U.S. News provide law schools with detailed
and specific instructions as to how to compute them. The ABA does not
do so in its questionnaire; those charged with filling out the U.S. News
questionnaire therefore typically have no guidance as to how to perform
the computation. 20 6 The result, as noted, is a set of published U.S. News
numbers that does not match the corresponding ABA numbers. To the
extent that U.S. News implicitly represents that it is publishing compara-
ble data, its publication is misleading.
Even if U.S. News were to bring its numbers into line with the ABA's,
however, there would still be problems. I disagree with the ABA's deci-
sion to compute student/faculty ratios based solely on schools' J.D. en-
rollments. The ABA's ratios misrepresent the true number of students
with a claim on faculty time for schools with large non-J.D. populations.
The extent of this misrepresentation is given in Appendix C.
More fundamentally, readers are likely to interpret student/faculty ra-
tios as proxies for class size and student-faculty interaction. Because of
the problems identified in Part II, they are not valid proxies for either.
Nor are they valid proxies for the quality of a school's clinical program.
Finally, as is true of expenditures per student, linear use of student/faculty
ratios in a ranking algorithm necessarily assumes that legal education in-
volves no significant economies of scale. This cannot be true. To provide
the same subject-matter coverage the faculty at a small school must be
larger, relative to its student body, than the faculty at a large school. In
conclusion, U.S. News's current use of student/faculty ratios is more likely
to mislead than inform.
6. Library
As discussed in Part II, current acquisitions budgets are far more indic-
ative of institutions' current commitments to their libraries than volume
or title counts. At the very least, I suggest that U.S. News add such budg-
ets to its computations. I also feel compelled to note astonishment that
the quality of a law school's library should count less than one percent in
assessing the quality of the law school as a whole.207 A law school is,
among other things, a research institution. The quality of its research fa-
cilities is certainly more relevant to me than it appears to be to U.S. News.
206. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 2007 U.S. Law Schools Statistical Survey, at
Question 80.
207. See America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 45.
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B. COMPUTING THE RANKINGS
In Part II.A, I suggested that because of the way U.S. News computes
overall scores and ranks, very small changes in data or methodology
could produce large changes in rank-or at least changes likely to be per-
ceived as large by the typical reader. In other words, I suggested that
U.S. News's ranks were "unreliable" in a statistical sense. Here, I suggest
changes in the way U.S. News computes overall scores and ranks that
would minimize their unreliability.
1. Use a consistent forced mean and standard deviation in computing
overall scores
One of the major problems with U.S. News's current rescaling al-
gorithm is that U.S. News forces the score of its top-ranked school to
equal 100 and that of its bottom-ranked school to equal zero.20 8 This
causes its overall scores to be unusually sensitive to small changes in the
reported data of those two schools. It also makes reporting the overall
scores of third- and fourth-tier schools unpalatable. This, in turn, makes
the rankings much less useful for prospective students and faculty making
choices among third and fourth tier schools. By my computation, U.S.
News's fourth tier includes schools with overall scores ranging from zero
to 27. That is a very large spread. The same difference further up the
rankings would determine whether a school is in the top twenty or just
barely in the top one hundred. By lumping these schools together in a
single "fourth tier," U.S. News obscures their differences.
All of these problems could be solved by rescaling the raw combined
scores using a consistent forced mean and forced standard deviation. I
suggest a mean of 75 and a standard deviation of 10, although any other
consistent forced mean and standard deviation would work mathemati-
cally. This proposed change would result in overall scores ranging from
101.48 for Yale down to 56.59 for the bottom-ranked school. One of the
principal consequences would be that changes in the data for Yale or the
bottom-ranked school would have no more effect on the relative ranks of
other schools than changes in the data of any other school. In addition,
however, U.S. News would be able to report overall scores for all ranked
schools, making the rankings much more useful for prospective students
and faculty attempting to decide among schools that are now merely
lumped together as third or fourth tier-almost half of all U.S. law
schools. 20 9
2. Report overall scores to two decimal places
A second feature that contributes to the unreliability of U.S. News's
current algorithm is that overall scores are rounded to the nearest integer
208. See Morse, supra note 22.
209. See America's Best Graduate Schools, supra note 4, at 44-47.
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and then lumped together by integer for ranking purposes.210 As has
been noted, this can cause major ranking shifts by reason of very small
changes in data or method. Reporting overall scores to two decimal
places and ranking accordingly would solve this problem.
3. Eliminate the third and fourth tiers and report overall scores and
ranks for all law schools
The single most damaging feature of U.S. News's current ranking prac-
tice is the fact that it lumps some number of schools into tiers. 211 Moving
down a rank, or even 20 ranks, is unpleasant but not a disaster. Moving
down a tier can be catastrophic. Applicants stop applying. Employers
stop interviewing. Students transfer out. Faculty members shop their re-
sumes. The damage can be permanent. If anyone were ever to have a
plausible cause of action against U.S. News, it would probably be a school
pushed into a lower tier by some arbitrary change in U.S. News's method,
or students at such a school.
Not only is this aspect of U.S. News's current practice reprehensible,
hurting large numbers of students and staff each year, it is unnecessary.
If U.S. News were to use a consistent forced mean and standard deviation
in computing its overall scores, as recommended, it could report overall
scores and ranks for all law schools and eliminate tiers altogether.
CONCLUSION
What I have found most interesting in analyzing U.S. News's rankings
are the surprises in the nitty-gritty details. It would be impossible to sum-
marize even a small portion of those surprises here. I came to this project
with the assumption that there was probably some core of validity and
reliability to the rankings, despite all of our complaints. I leave conclud-
ing that that core is very small, if indeed it exists at all.
Law school deans know that rankings management is a Red Queen's
race-one must sprint just to stay in place. In the U.S. News world, the
race sometimes goes to the school with the greatest flexibility to manage
its numbers and the will to do so. This is not necessarily the school that
provides the best education for its students, the best working environ-
ment for its faculty, or the best graduates for prospective employers. But
that is the world in which we currently live.
I have made a number of recommendations as to how to improve the
validity and reliability of U.S. News's rankings. I am not optimistic they
will be followed. I conclude, therefore, by pointing out what many others
have said before me: the situation will likely improve significantly only
when multiple widely-read ranking systems come to compete.
In my view, the ABA contributes significantly to U.S. News's monop-
oly. The ABA requires compilation of great amounts of information,
210. See id. at 44.
211. See id. at 44-47.
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thereby making U.S. News's rankings possible. But it keeps most of that
information secret, at least within the time frames relevant to possible
entrants to the law school ranking business. This secrecy, in turn, raises
significant barriers to entry for possible U.S. News competitors. This Ar-
ticle's ultimate recommendation to the ABA would be to post the most
relevant variables it collects promptly and publicly on the internet and
waive copyright protection with respect to that posting.212 Competitor
rankings would inevitably spring up. Students, faculty, and employers
would be much better served. And the world of legal education would
cease to be forced to dance to a single piper's tune.
212. As of June 23, 2007, the ABA accepted this recommendation, posting a wide range
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Howard 1.5 0.6 2.1 0.7
Idaho 2.2 -0.2 2.6 0.1
Illinois 3.7 -0.3 3.9 -0.2
Indiana Bloomington 3.3 -0.1 3.5 0.2
Indiana Indianapolis 2.0 0.5 2.5 0.6
Iowa 3.0 0.5 3.3 0.5
John Marshall Chicago 1.9 -0.1 2.3 0.1
Kansas 2.5 0.1 2.9 0.4
Kentucky 2.8 -0.3 3.1 -0.3
Lewis & Clark 3.0 -0.7 3.3 -0.2
Louisiana State 2.2 0.1 2.6 0.3
Louisville (Brandeis) 2.3 -0.1 2.7 -0.3
Loyola Chicago 2.8 -0.5 3.1 0.0
Loyola Los Angeles 3.0 -0.5 3.3 -0.4
Loyola New Orleans 1.9 0.2 2.3 0.5
Maine 2.2 0.0 2.6 0.3
Marquette 2.3 0.0 2.7 0.1
Maryland 3.0 -0.1 3.3 -0.2
McGeorge 2.5 -0.4 2.9 -0.3
Memphis (Humphreys) 2.2 -0.4 2.6 -0.5
Mercer 2.2 -0.2 2.6 0.4
Miami 2.3 0.5 2.7 0.4
Michigan 4.0 0.6 4.2 0.3
Michigan State 2.5 -0.4 2.9 -0.1
Minnesota 3.4 0.2 3.7 0.0
Mississippi 2.0 0.2 2.5 0.3
Mississippi College 1.2 0.3 1.8 0.6
Missouri Columbia 2.5 0.2 2.9 0.2
Missouri Kansas City 1.9 0.3 2.3 0.6
Montana 1.9 0.1 2.3 0.4
Nebraska 2.2 0.2 2.6 0.5
Nevada 2.5 -0.4 2.9 -0.7
New England 1.4 0.3 1.9 -0.1
New Mexico 2.0 0.4 2.5 0.2
New York 2.2 -0.1 2.6 -0.1
North Carolina 3.0 0.6 3.3 0.6
North Carolina Central 0.8 0.7 1.4 0.5
North Dakota 1.2 0.7 1.8 0.9
Northeastern 3.0 -0.7 3.3 -0.8
Northern Illinois 2.2 -0.5 2.6 -0.4
Northern Kentucky 2.0 -0.4 2.5 -0.5
Northwestern 4.2 -0.1 4.4 -0.3
Notre Dame 3.6 -0.3 3.8 -0.1
Nova Southeastern 1.4 0.4 1.9 -0.4
NYU 4.4 0.2 4.5 0.0
Ohio Northern 1.5 0.0 2.1 0.3
Ohio State 3.0 0.2 3.3 0.3
Oklahoma 2.3 0.1 2.7 0.4
Oklahoma City 1.1 0.5 1.7 0.5
Oregon 2.6 0.2 3.0 0.2
Pace 1.9 0.2 2.3 0.0
Pennsylvania 4.2 0.2 4.4 0.0
Pennsylvania State 2.0 0.2 2.5 0.7
Pepperdine 2.6 -0.4 3.0 0.1
Pittsburgh 2.6 0.2 3.0 -0.2
Quinnipiac 2.2 -0.3 2.6 -0.4
Regent 1.7 -0.3 2.2 -0.5
Richmond 3.0 -0.8 3.3 -0.2
Roger Williams 1.5 0.2 2.1 -0.2
Rutgers Camden 3.0 -0.5 3.3 -0.4
Rutgers Newark 2.5 0.1 2.9 0.0
Samford 2.2 -0.4 2.6 -0.1
San Diego 3.1 -0.3 3.4 -0.5
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San Francisco 2.6 -0.4 3.0 -0.1
Santa Clara 2.6 -0.2 3.0 -0.1
Seattle 2.2 0.0 2.6 0.1
Seton Hall 2.8 -0.4 3.1 -0.3
SMU (Dedman) 3.1 -0.5 3.4 -0.2
South Carolina 2.3 0.0 2.7 0.1
South Dakota 1.7 0.1 2.2 0.7
South Texas 1.7 0.0 2.2 -0.3
Southern 0.6 0.7 1.2 0.4
Southern Illinois 1.9 0.1 2.3 0.3
Southwestern 2.2 -0.4 2.6 -0.6
St. John's 2.8 -0.5 3.1 -0.3
St. Louis 2.3 0.1 2.7 0.4
St. Mary's 1.7 0.0 2.2 0.1
St. Thomas 1.1 0.3 1.7 0.1
Stanford 4.2 0.6 4.4 0.4
Stetson 1.9 0.2 2.3 0.2
Suffolk 2.2 -0.3 2.6 -0.5
SUNY Buffalo 2.0 0.5 2.5 0.2
Syracuse 1.9 0.5 2.3 0.8
Temple 3.0 -0.4 3.3 -0.2
Tennessee 2.8 -0.1 3.1 -0.3
Texas 3.7 0.4 3.9 0.2
Texas Southern 0.8 0.7 1.4 0.5
Texas Tech 1.9 0.1 2.3 0.1
Texas Wesleyan 2.0 -0.4 2.5 -0.5
Thomas Jefferson 1.7 -0.3 2.2 0.2
Thomas M. Cooley 1.1 0.2 1.7 0.2
Toledo 2.6 -0.7 3.0 -0.6
Touro 1.4 0.3 1.9 -0.1
Tulane 3.0 0.2 3.3 0.2
Tulsa 1.5 0.5 2.1 0.4
U Washington 3.1 0.1 3.4 -0.1
UC Berkeley 3.7 0.8 3.9 0.6
UC Davis 3.0 0.4 3.3 0.3
UC Hastings 3.3 0.0 3.5 0.2
UCLA 3.7 0.3 3.9 0.0
USC (Gould) 3.7 0.1 3.9 -0.4
Utah 2.8 0.0 3.1 -0.3
Valparaiso 1.5 0.4 2.1 0.6
Vanderbilt 3.6 0.2 3.8 0.2
Vermont 1.9 0.3 2.3 0.3
Villanova 3.1 -0.5 3.4 -0.6
Virginia 4.2 0.3 4.4 0.2
Wake Forest 3.4 -0.4 3.7 -0.2
Washburn 1.7 0.2 2.2 0.5
Washington & Lee 3.3 0.1 3.5 0.3
Washington U 3.7 -0.2 3.9 -0.2
Wayne State 2.2 0.1 2.6 0.2
West Virginia 1.4 0.6 1.9 0.6
Western New England 1.9 -0.4 2.3 -0.7
Whittier 1.9 -0.5 2.3 -0.4
Widener Delaware 1.7 0.1 2.2 0.0
Willamette 2.0 0.1 2.5 0.2
William & Mary 3.4 -0.1 3.7 -0.1
William Mitchell 1.9 0.0 2.3 0.5
Wisconsin 3.0 0.5 3.3 0.2
Wyoming 1.7 0.3 2.2 0.6
Yale 4.7 0.2 4.8 0.1
2007] Law School Rankings 565
Appendix B: Top 100 Schools
Ranked by Estimated 100th LSATs
Estimated Estimated
Rank Law School 100th LSAT 50th LSAT
1 Harvard 177 178
2 Columbia 173 174
3 NYU 172 173
4 Virginia 171 172
4 Yale 171 175
6 Chicago 170 172
6 Georgetown 170 170
6 Northwestern 170 171
9 Michigan 169 170
9 Pennsylvania 169 171
9 Stanford 169 172
12 Texas 168 170
12 UC Berkeley 168 170
12 UCLA 168 170
15 Duke 167 169
15 George Washington 167 168
17 Cornell 166 168
17 Fordham 166 167
17 Minnesota 166 168
17 USC (Gould) 166 167
21 BC 165 167
21 BU 165 166
21 Vanderbilt 165 167
21 Washington U 165 167
25 Cardozo 164 166
25 Emory 164 165
25 Illinois 164 167
25 Notre Dame 164 167
25 UC Hastings 164 165
30 American 163 164
30 Brooklyn 163 164
30 Loyola Los Angeles 163 164
30 San Diego 163 164
30 Wake Forest 163 165
30 William & Mary 163 165
36 BYU 162 165
36 Florida 162 164
36 George Mason 162 165
36 Indiana Bloomington 162 164
36 Lewis & Clark 162 164
36 Maryland 162 165
36 North Carolina 162 164
36 Temple 162 164
36 Tulane 162 164
36 Villanova 162 163
36 Washington & Lee 162 165
36 Wisconsin 162 164
48 Alabama 161 163
48 Chi-Kent 161 163
48 Colorado 161 164
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48 Georgia 161 164
48 Houston 161 163
48 Iowa 161 163
48 Northeastern 161 163
48 Ohio State 161 164
48 Richmond 161 163
48 SMU (Dedman) 161 164
48 U Washington 161 165
48 UC Davis 161 164
60 Arizona 160 163
60 Baylor 160 163
60 Denver 160 163
60 DePaul 160 162
60 Florida State 160 161
60 Loyola Chicago 160 163
60 Miami 160 161
60 Pepperdine 160 161
60 Pittsburgh 160 161
60 Rutgers Camden 160 163
60 San Francisco 160 162
60 Santa Clara 160 162
60 Seattle 160 162
60 Seton Hall 160 161
60 St. John's 160 162
75 Arizona State 159 162
75 Case Western 159 161
75 Catholic 159 160
75 Connecticut 159 162
75 Georgia State 159 160
75 Hofstra 159 160
75 Kentucky 159 163
75 McGeorge 159 160
75 Suffolk 159 160
84 Indiana Indianapolis 158 159
84 Michigan State 158 161
84 New York 158 158
84 Oregon 158 160
84 Rutgers Newark 158 161
84 South Carolina 158 160
84 St. Louis 158 160
84 Utah 158 161
92 Louisiana State 157 159
92 Marquette 157 159
92 Missouri Columbia 157 159
92 South Texas 157 158
92 Southwestern 157 159
92 Texas Tech 157 159
92 Toledo 157 159
92 Wayne State 157 159
92 William Mitchell 157 159
Law School Rankings
Appendix C: Inflation Effect of Computing Expenditures
Per Student and Student/Faculty Ratios


































































































































































Thomas M. Cooley 1%
Rutgers Camden 1%
All other schools 0%
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Appendix D: Leading and Lagging Input Variables:
Extent to Which Variables Pull Overall Score Up or Down,
Measured in Overall Score Points
Ace Bar
Peer Lawyer Median Median Rate Empl Empl 9 Pass Educ Noneduc Fac/Stud






Arizona State 0.8 -0.6
Arkansas Fayetteville -1.3 0.5
Arkansas Little Rock -1.1 -0.4



























Detroit Mercy -0.2 -1.1






Florida Coastal -2.6 -1.8
Florida State 0.1 -1.1
Fordham 0.3 -0.7
Franklin Pierce -0.4 -0.1
George Mason -1.8 -0.8
George Washington 1.1 0.9
Georgetown 3.1 1.6
Georgia -0.1 0.0
Georgia State -0.6 0.1










Indiana Bloomington 0.7 1.4
Indiana Indianapolis -0.4 0.8
Iowa 1.3 1.0
John Marshall Chicago -0.3 0.4
Kansas 0.1 1.6
Kentucky -0.9 -0.9
Lewis & Clark -1.7 0.8
Louisiana State -1.3 0.1
Louisville (Brandeis) -1.1 -1.7
0.9 0.5 0.2 0.4 1.1 0.1 0.0
1.5 -0.5 -0.1 -0.7 0.9 0.3 1.2
-03 -1.6 -0.5 -0.5 2.8 0.2 0.9
0.7 -0.8 0.0 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.2
07 0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.9 0.1 -0.1
0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.2 0.5
-0.9 0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.6 0.1 0.3
-1,9 0.1 0.9 0.2 2.8 -0.1 -0.3
0.8 -0.9 -1.8 -0.9 0.0 1.3 4.0
0.5 -0.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.7
0.9 2.0 0.3 -0.2 1.7 0.3 -1.1
1.0 0.7 0.1 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 -2.4
1.5 -0.9 .1 0.0 2.0 0.2 0.1
0.7 0.2 -0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -1.3
1.2 2.0 -0.3 0.2 0.5 -0.4 0.5
1.6 2.3 0.4 -1.6 -13.7 0.5 2.9
1.2 -0.2 0.9 1.4 -0.4 0.3 0.0
-04 -0.6 -0.1 0.2 1.4 0.1 0.3
1.7 0.3 0.1 0.0 1.2 0.0 -0.8
-0.6 -1.5 0.0 -0.1 1.4 0.0 1.2
0.7 -0.8 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 -2.0
1.4 0.6 0.3 -0.1 2.3 0.5 -0.6
-0.4 -1.1 -0.2 0.1 -2.5 -0.4 -1.6
1.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 0.2
0.7 2.2 -0.7 -0.1 0.9 0.1 -0.3
-0.6 1.0 0.1 0.2 1.3 -0.1 0.1
1.2 1.8 -0.1 -0.2 -2.2 0.2 -1.0
-0.9 -1.5 -0.3 -0.1 -3.3 -0.3 2.1
0.3 -0.8 0.4 -0.7 0.5 0.1 0.6
0.0 -0.3 -0.4 0.2 -2.0 -0.1 -0.7
-2.4 1.6 -0.4 0.3 2.7 -0.1 -1.2
-1.4 -0.2 1.0 -1.2 -3.6 -0.1 3.9
-0.1 -0.9 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.7
0.3 -1.6 0.2 1.0 1.9 -0.5 0.4
1.1 -0.3 0.2 0.7 1.1 -0.1 -0.7
-2.2 0.0 -0.4 0.6 3.1 0.3 -0.7
-0.1 -1.7 1.1 0.2 -0.7 -0.8 2.2
-1.2 0.9 -0.7 0.1 2.3 0.0 0.1
-0.2 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -1.8 0.0 -0.2
-0.3 1.6 -0.6 1.1 -0.1 0.1 -1.2
0.4 -1.4 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.3
-0.6 0.8 0.0 -0.6 0.0 -0.1 -0.7
-0.7 -0.2 0.1 0.6 3.4 0.3 0.3
0.1 -0.5 0.2 0.6 1.9 -0.1 -1.3
1.1 -0.5 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.1 -0.3
-0.1 -1.2 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 1.6
1.1 -0.6 0.4 1.0 1.1 -0.2 1.1
0.9 -0.3 0.0 0.5 -0.5 0.0 -2.1
0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -1.9 -0.1 -2.2
1.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.7 -0.1 -0.1
1.5 -0.4 0.5 -0.2 0.7 0.2 -1.3
1.4 0.6 0.4 -0.3 -4.3 -0.6 0.1
-0.8 0.0 -0.2 0.1 2.1 0.0 -1.2
1.1 1.1 -0.2 -0.4 -1.2 0.1 -0.7
-1.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -3.9 -0.3 1.5
0.7 0.3 0.6 0.1 1.1 -0.1 -1.2
0.1 -0.2 -0.4 0.0 1.2 -0.2 -0.9
1.3 0.7 0.2 -0.2 1.3 0.1 0.0
-1.9 -0.8 0.6 1.2 -0.3 -0.6 -1.3
0.3 0.6 0.1 -0.9 0.1 0.1 0.5
1.6 -3.0 0.3 -0.5 0.5 -0.3 -1.2
1.0 -1.0 -0.9 0.4 -0.5 -0.1 -1.2
-1.5 1.0 -0.1 0.8 0.8 -0.2 -0.4
-0.5 0.0 -1.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5
0.3 -2.1 0.0 0.0 1.7 -0.1 0.7
0.2 1.7 0.1 -0.8 -1.4 -0.1 -1.3
1.2 1.5 -0.4 -0.3 1.9 0.0 -1.3
2.0 -0.7 -0.6 -0.3 0.8 -0.2 -0.4
-0.7 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.1 -0.4 0.7











































































Loyola Los Angeles -0.8










































































































































-0.6 0.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -0.5
-1.0 0.8 0.0 -1.5 0.0 1.0
-0.1 -0.7 -0.3 -3.2 -0.1 2.7
2.0 0.5 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.8
-0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -1.3
1.1 0.1 0.0 -1.1 0.4 -0.6
-1.0 0.0 0.0 -1.4 0.1 0.9
0.2 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 -0.7
-0.3 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.1 1.0
-0.7 0.0 0.2 -2.4 -0.1 -0.1
0.1 0.0 0.1 0.9 -0.2 0.2
1.6 0.2 -0.5 -0.1 0.6 -1.7
-0.5 -0.1 0.2 1.5 -0.1 -1.5
-0.8 0.6 0.2 2.1 -0.1 -0.9
1.0 -0.3 -0.2 2.5 -0.1 0.0
-1.4 0.1 -0.6 0.5 0.0 -0.8
1.4 0.0 -0.4 -4.3 0.3 1.0
-0.5 0.8 0.9 0.2 -0.1 -0.2
-1.2 0.3 0.0 1.3 -0.3 -0.9
-1.4 0.1 0.0 3.4 0.2 0.3
-1.2 0.2 -0.2 -1.3 0.3 -0.6
-0.7 -0.1 -0.1 1.7 0.2 -1.0
-0.4 -0.5 0.4 1.4 0.3 -1.3
0.1 0.2 -0.4 3.6 0.0 -0.6
-1.6 0.2 1.2 1.8 0.0 0.5
0.5 0.1 -0.5 0.2 0.0 0.9
0.8 -0.3 -0.4 1.9 0.1 -1.4
0.3 0.1 -0.3 -3.5 0.1 0.3
-0.2 0.1 0.0 -1.0 0.1 1.5
-3.9 1.2 0.8 3.6 -1.2 3.0
1.2 -0.2 -0.4 -2.0 0.1 2.1
-0.2 0.5 1.1 1.8 0.1 -0.7
-0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.5
1.6 -0.6 0.2 0.7 -0.1 -1.4
-1.2 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.3 1.0
-1.0 0.4 -0.5 -6.9 0.3 2.7
0.4 0.0 -0.4 -4.2 0.3 3.2
1.1 0.4 -0.8 0.7 0.1 2.3
0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.6 0.1 -1.1
0.0 -0.4 0.9 1.4 0.1 0.1
-0.9 -0.2 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.0
-1.3 -0.1 -0.1 1.0 0.1 -0.8
2.2 0.4 -0.6 -2.8 0.0 0.3
-0.2 -0.1 0.3 -1.6 -0.2 -2.5
-2.9 1.2 1.6 -1.6 -0.3 1.7
2.0 -0.2 0.7 2.5 0.3 -0.3
-0.9 0.5 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 1.4
-1.5 0.9 0.3 0.5 -0.7 -1.0
-1.1 -1.4 0.1 -2.2 0.0 3.2































































-0.1 0.5 -0.4 -5.2 0.2 1.7
0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.9 -1.7
-1.2 0.0 -0.3 0.5 -0.1 1.7
1.2 0.0 0.4 0.5 -0.1 -1.3
1.0 0.2 0.1 -2.0 0.2 -3.0
1.0 -0.1 0.1 -2.2 0.3 -2.0
0.5 0.0 -1.0 -1.4 0.6 -3.5
0.2 0.0 0.2 -1.0 0.5 -1.6
0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.8 0.3 -0.1
2.4 -0.3 -0.2 -1.0 -0.2 -0.4
0.6 0.9 -1.2 -1.6 0.2 -0.8
0.6 -0.3 0.2 -1.6 -0.3 -0.6
-2.2 -1.1 0.1 2.0 -0.3 2.9
0.7 -0.3 -0.2 1.8 -0.2 -1.5
-0.7 -0.4 0.1 -2.3 -0.2 -2.0
-1.1 0.0 -0.1 -1.7 0.1 0.4
0.0 -0.2 0.1 1.7 -0.2 0.8
-0.3 -0.1 -0.4 -3.0 0.0 1.7
0.0 -0.3 0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -1.8
2.4 -0.4 -0.4 -1.5 0.5 -1.9
3.0 -0.1 -0.3 -2.0 0.4 -0.2
-0.8 -0.1 0.4 -0.6 0.0 1.3
-1.3 0.5 0.2 3.3 -0.6 -1.0
-1.5 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.2
1.2 -0.1 -0.3 -1.2 0.5 -0.7
0.8 -0.1 0.2 -0.7 0.0 -1.4
1.3 -0.7 -0.1 -0.5 0.2 -0.2
0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 0.1 -1.5
0.3 0.5 -0.3 -1.4 0.3 -0.1
-0.3 -0.1 -0.8 -5.4 -0.5 8.1
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Appendix E: How Far Median LSATs or Bar Pass Rates
Would Need to Move to Move a School's

























































One OS One OS

























































One OS One OS























































574 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
Harvard N/A 165 N/A 65%
Hawaii 160 156 N/A 44%
Hofstra 159 155 100% 37%
Houston 162 157 N/A 52%
Howard 153 150 82% 22%
Idaho 157 153 N/A 44%
Illinois 180 162 N/A 54%
Indiana Bloomington 166 160 N/A 57%
Indiana Indianapolis 156 153 N/A 45%
Iowa 164 158 N/A 53%
John Marshall Chicago 156 152 N/A 39%
Kansas 160 156 N/A 48%
Kentucky 162 157 N/A 50%
Lewis & Clark 164 158 98% 38%
Louisiana State 157 153 N/A 41%
Louisville (Brandeis) 159 155 N/A 47%
Loyola Chicago 162 157 N/A 56%
Loyola Los Angeles 164 158 91% 40%
Loyola New Orleans 156 152 97% 23%
Maine 157 153 N/A 38%
Marquette 159 155 N/A 65%
Maryland 164 158 N/A 48%
McGeorge 160 156 94% 43%
Memphis (Humphreys) 157 153 N/A 52%
Mercer 157 153 N/A 57%
Miami 159 155 N/A 52%
Michigan N/A 163 N/A 64%
Michigan State 160 156 98% 37%
Minnesota 168 160 N/A 61%
Mississippi 156 153 N/A 52%
Mississippi College 151 148 N/A 46%
Missouri Columbia 160 156 N/A 52%
Missouri Kansas City 156 152 N/A 48%
Montana 156 152 N/A 51%
Nebraska 157 153 N/A 54%
Nevada 160 156 96% 35%
New England 152 149 N/A 39%
New Mexico 156 153 N/A 46%
New York 157 153 96% 33%
North Carolina 164 158 N/A 53%
North Carolina Central 148 144 N/A 40%
North Dakota 151 148 N/A 49%
Northeastern 164 158 N/A 47%
Northern Illinois 157 153 N/A 51%
Northern Kentucky 156 153 N/A 47%
Northwestern N/A 164 N/A 62%
Notre Dame 172 161 N/A 60%
Nova Southeastern 152 149 92% 31%
NYU N/A 164 N/A 66%
Ohio Northern 153 150 N/A 38%
Ohio State 164 158 N/A 58%
Oklahoma 159 155 N/A 61%
Oklahoma City 150 147 N/A 37%
Oregon 161 156 N/A 45%
Pace 156 152 N/A 42%
Pennsylvania N/A 164 N/A 62%
Pennsylvania State 156 153 N/A 44%
Pepperdine 161 156 100% 49%
Pittsburgh 161 156 N/A 48%
Quinnipiac 157 153 N/A 40%
Regent 154 151 92% 30%
Richmond 164 158 N/A 44%
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Roger Williams 153 150 N/A 39%
Rutgers Camden 164 158 N/A 48%
Rutgers Newark 160 156 N/A 39%
Samford 157 153 N/A 51%
San Diego 165 159 96% 45%
San Francisco 161 156 91% 40%
Santa Clara 161 156 93% 42%
Seattle 157 153 N/A 47%
Seton Hall 162 157 N/A 49%
SMU (Dedman) 165 159 N/A 55%
South Carolina 159 155 N/A 52%
South Dakota 154 151 N/A 39%
South Texas 154 151 N/A 37%
Southern 147 143 71% -3%
Southern Illinois 156 152 N/A 48%
Southwestern 157 153 84% 33%
St. John's 162 157 N/A 55%
St. Louis 159 155 N/A 49%
St. Mary's 154 151 N/A 46%
St. Thomas 150 147 92% 31%
Stanford N/A 164 N/A 66%
Stetson 156 152 N/A 44%
Suffolk 157 153 N/A 44%
SUNY Buffalo 156 153 N/A 48%
Syracuse 156 152 N/A 45%
Temple 164 158 N/A 54%
Tennessee 162 157 N/A 53%
Texas N/A 162 N/A 59%
Texas Southern 148 144 87% 22%
Texas Tech 156 152 N/A 52%
Texas Wesleyan 156 153 98% 33%
Thomas Jefferson 154 151 61% 10%
Thomas M. Cooley 150 147 86% 24%
Toledo 161 156 N/A 57%
Touro 152 149 97% 34%
Tulane 164 158 N/A 33%
Tulsa 153 150 N/A 40%
U Washington 165 159 N/A 56%
UC Berkeley N/A 162 N/A 58%
UC Davis 164 158 N/A 50%
UC Hastings 166 160 N/A 55%
UCLA N/A 162 N/A 61%
USC (Gould) N/A 162 N/A 55%
Utah 162 157 N/A 51%
Valparaiso 153 150 N/A 48%
Vanderbilt 172 161 N/A 56%
Vermont 156 152 N/A 38%
Villanova 165 159 N/A 45%
Virginia N/A 164 N/A 60%
Wake Forest 168 160 N/A 57%
Washburn 154 151 N/A 38%
Washington & Lee 166 160 N/A 55%
Washington U 180 162 N/A 59%
Wayne State 157 153 N/A 53%
West Virginia 152 149 N/A 48%
Western New England 156 152 N/A 34%
Whittier 156 152 65% 14%
Widener Delaware 154 151 N/A 38%
Willamette 156 153 N/A 53%
William & Mary 168 160 N/A 54%
William Mitchell 156 152 N/A 51%
Wisconsin 164 158 N/A 65%
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Wyoming 154 151 99% 42%
Yale N/A 164 N/A 63%
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